Counter-Terrorism Bill

The hon. and learned Gentleman is far more versed in these matters than I am, and I would not like to speculate on that point. I wish to finish discussing this issue by pointing out that, in effect, it would be parliamentary scrutiny of an Executive decision undertaken entirely after the event and without any capacity to influence that decision. If we vote for these provisions, let no-one here pretend that we have done other than extend the period of detention without charge. There will be no vote before the fact—we will not even have the ability to oppose a statutory instrument. Some have suggested that the period before parliamentary approval should be shortened, perhaps to a week or 10 days. That would improve the provision's appearance, but the reality would remain fatally flawed. Why? Because we are dealing with a fatal mixing of the legislative and the judicial. If there is to be a debate on whether to extend detention while someone is being so detained, it is surely dangerous for us to look at the matter. What are the Government to say? They are bound to want to give details of the case in a prejudicial manner, noting the extreme seriousness of the circumstances and so forth. Alternatively, Ministers will clam up and say, ““Trust us, but we cannot tell you anything.”” Debate will either be constitutionally outrageous or a pointless impossibility. Parliament should make the law, and not get involved in individual cases. Ministers are entitled to ask what alternatives we would suggest in the face of a heightened threat. The Bill itself makes a good start on doing that, and I hope that we can build on that in Committee. First, the Bill contains the suggestion that intercept evidence would be used only in cases of asset freezing, but it does not go far enough. Such evidence should be admissible in all cases. That would give the prosecution the option to use it, even if it does not want to go ahead for reasons of avoiding disclosure and compromising techniques and sources.