Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

We have not done any detailed comparative work to that effect, so I cannot answer my hon. Friend's question one way or the other. However, I would be surprised if that were the case and we had a very different regime under common law, looking at the issue of terrorism more generally, compared with some of the civil law countries. It is important to recognise that mistakes can be made, especially when one is working on the basis of intelligence, as the Lotfi Raissi case graphically illustrated a couple of weeks ago—although in a very different context to control orders. We believe that we must have safeguards against such problems commensurate both with public safety and protection of sources. For that reason, we would like to see incorporated in the law an absolute guaranteed right to a fair hearing. The House of Lords, in a recent case, said that those words should be read into the statute, but they do not appear there. Without that reference, there is a lack of certainty in the law and we need that express reference. We believe that the gist of the closed material should be disclosed to the controlee. That can be done in a way that protects sources, but the controlee is entitled to know at least the basis of the case against him. We believe that special advocates, with the leave of the court—through an application to the High Court ex parte—should be permitted to discuss closed material in those circumstances with a controlee, if authorised by the court to do so. We believe that the Secretary of State should give reasons for the making of the control order. The standard of proof is also important. Reasonable suspicion is a very low standard, compared with the seriousness of the consequences for the controlee of the making of the order. We think that the balance of probabilities would be a better test. We also think—although it would probably be of less utility—that the special advocates should be able to call rebuttal witnesses. At present, their right to do so is questionable. I mentioned the need for an exit strategy. Seven of the controlees have been under a control order now for two years. Two of the 15 have been under a control order for three years, and we believe that for the three years before that they were in indefinite detention in Belmarsh. That makes six years, all together, in detention or under control for people who have not been convicted of any offence at all. We run the risk of creating Guantanamo-style martyrs. Perhaps they are not as visible. They are not under the same sort of oppressive regime, for sure. Perhaps they are in the gilded cage of Acacia avenue rather than the harshness of a Cuban camp, but we have still seen indefinite restrictions on their freedom and six years is far too long. After such a length of time, as Lord Carlile says, those people will be of questionable use to any terrorist group. Such groups prefer to work with people with clean skins, as we saw in all the terrorist attacks that have taken place so far. The individuals concerned are clearly fingered and subject to ongoing monitoring.