Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair criticism, but the serendipitous effect of having the debate at this stage is that it enables us to put before the House our recommendations for reform and gives the Government time to consider those recommendations when we consider the terrorism Bill later. It would, however, be far better if we had the time to debate the issues properly and in an informed way. On the terms of the control orders and whether they amount to deprivation of liberty, the Government say that none of the control orders now in force—or indeed ever made—derogate from article 5 of the convention on the right to liberty. If that were the case, only courts could make such orders. We need to consider the restrictions in the control orders in combination with each other and with the daily length of the curfew. As has been said, the Government have extrapolated from the House of Lords decision the belief that 16 hours is satisfactory, but that is to quote only part of the views of Lord Brown, who goes on to say in his judgment, on which the Government rely:"““It may be, indeed, that 16 hours is too long. I would, however, leave it to the Strasbourg Court to decide upon that””." Our view is that 16 hours is too long. The average control order is now 10 hours, and our view is that 12 hours would be an appropriate length. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights, in a case involving Italy, has found that nine hours amounted to deprivation of liberty, so there would be severe and serious consequences for liberty if the maximum daily limit were not reviewed. One of the Committee's main concerns arises from questions of due process. We are in something of a Kafkaesque world when it comes to the way control orders are brought forward—or perhaps I should cite Henry VIII's star chamber, as that was only a few yards away from where we are today. The Secretary of State gives no reasons for making the control order to the controlee, who is not told of the case against him to the extent that it is based on closed material. The special advocate—the controlee's lawyer—cannot discuss the case with his client. The control order is made solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion.