Time will not permit me to repeat the points that I made earlier, but they remain valid.
The more this debate has gone on, the more it has seemed extraordinary that this legislation has been passed so quickly—at least in this stage, through the House of Commons—only two days after the Prime Minister finally made his mind up on Sunday that, after all, he could be persuaded to nationalise the business. I strongly believe that for most of the past six months he has been the person resisting nationalisation in any circumstances, for a variety of political motives. We shall never know which Treasury Ministers were allowed even to be involved in the tortuous process of decision making, but at last common sense has prevailed and the Government have taken control of events in that way.
We have discussed the best use that the Government could make of taking the bank into public ownership. I repeat, briefly, what I said before. The financial stability of the banking system was the main objective of intervention from the word go. The financial stability of the banking system now depends in part on having some understanding of what the Government's strategic policy is and what strategic direction they have given the bank's new management. The question throughout this debate has been: do they intend the bank to be grown, in order to maximise the proceeds when it is sold, or do they intend to wind it down and have an orderly sale of the assets?
The frank truth is that we have had no answer. Depending on whether north-east Labour MPs or people looking at the issue from the point of the view of the City are being addressed, slightly different answers come forward, but the matter will apparently be determined by the Commissioner for Competition in Brussels. I assume that that means that the negotiations will be conducted on the basis that the bank will be expanded as rapidly as possible, up to the limits that Miss Kroes will permit and which are still compatible with state aid rules.
The most extraordinary thing that has emerged—it did so clearly only really on Third Reading, although it was referred to yesterday—is that the Prime Minister is perhaps now as bemused as we all are about precisely what assets we are nationalising. It has become clear that we are not acquiring the assets in Granite. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr. Dunne) is the only Member in the Chamber with a comprehensive knowledge of the arrangements, but the Minister could neither add nor subtract anything from what he said.
The best assets are in Granite—it looks as though there is a contract enabling more assets to be drawn in—and it is the rubbish in the assets that we are now nationalising. Where is all the constant assurance that we have had on the authority of the Financial Services Authority that this is a quality loan book? We have been reassured that it is an asset that is to be taken into public ownership and well managed, under the Government's wise direction, by the new managers that they have put in place. I would advise the Minister—
It being Midnight, Mr. Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to order [this day].
The House divided: Ayes 293, Noes 167.
Banking (Special Provisions) Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Clarke of Nottingham
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 19 February 2008.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee of the Whole House (HC) on Banking (Special Provisions) Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
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2007-08Chamber / Committee
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