Local Transport Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 4: 4: Clause 12, page 14, leave out lines 9 to 13 The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this amendment and its group is to remove the operator veto from statutory quality partnerships. I will refer later to a particular comment that was made in Committee. Under a statutory quality partnership arrangement, local transport authorities put in place improved infrastructure such as bus priority measures. Operators that wish to use that improved infrastructure must meet specified vehicle quality standards. The Bill addresses some weaknesses in the existing legislation, and allows a statutory quality partnership to specify frequencies, timings and maximum fares. However, the Bill also gives relevant operators a potential veto on these provisions where they have admissible objections. The definitions of ““relevant”” and ““admissible objections”” are set out in the December 2007 draft guidance and are very widely drawn. The operator veto on frequencies, timings and fares was not a feature of the draft Local Transport Bill; it has been put in following lobbying from operators. The draft guidance makes it clear that a wide range of operators will have a broad scope to veto key provisions of statutory quality partnership deals, which will reduce the ability of local transport authorities to negotiate soundly based deals with operators and will reduce the attractiveness of statutory quality partnerships as a policy tool. As I have said, the original draft Bill allowed statutory quality partnerships to specify frequencies and timings, and there were references in relation to fares, but without an operator veto. That was quite widely welcomed because if a local accountable transport authority is investing significantly in new facilities and in line with its wider transport strategy, then it should, having undertaken the consultation requirements set out in the legislation, be able to specify standards on issues such as frequencies and timings. With the right of veto over fares, timings and frequencies, the bargaining position of the operator vis-à-vis the local transport authority is strengthened further from the present situation where it already has, and will continue to have, the significant power to deregister services at any time on giving the appropriate period of notice. All parties now put emphasis on reviving the democratic process—on delegating decision-making down the line, and enabling as many as possible of the decisions affecting local areas and local communities to be made by those affected and their elected representatives. That was the thinking behind giving, for example, the Mayor of London and the GLA the powers they have in relation to transport. No doubt it was also behind the Government’s thinking as reflected by the draft Bill, which, as I say, did not provide for the veto powers over local transport authority decisions on statutory quality partnerships that are now provided for in this Bill. My objection over what has happened is not to the bus operators exercising their right to lobby in their own interests, but to the Government having backed down—in this instance on their basic principles over where decision-making power should preferably lie—at the first sound of gunfire without being able or willing to give any detailed, credible reason for their major change of tack, which will reduce the prospects of statutory quality partnerships being made. Presumably the original proposal in the draft Bill was not put in by the Government without considerable thought and without them carefully weighing up the pros and cons. Therefore, one would have thought that significant new evidence, information or arguments of which the Government had not previously been aware would have had to have been advanced for the Government to make such a fundamental change in their approach. If that was the case, the Government have not yet said in any detail what the new evidence, information or arguments have been which have overridden the compelling case in favour of the Government’s original stance. In Committee, the Minister described the circumstances in which a local transport authority might attempt to pursue a statutory quality partnership which set out unreasonable requirements in relation to maximum fares, frequencies and timings as ““highly unlikely””. This must indeed be the case, because it would not be in the interests of a local transport authority to promote a statutory quality partnership which was manifestly unreasonable or unworkable. Operators would not sign up to such a partnership, thus rendering the whole exercise pointless from the local transport authority perspective. There must be a feeling that the Government’s change from the draft Bill is to address an issue which in my noble friend’s view, on behalf of the Government, is ““highly unlikely””. The draft guidance, to which I have already referred, provides that an admissible objection can be that, "““the likely demand for the services would not be sufficient to enable operators to provide services, to the standard specified, on a commercial basis””." During Committee, the Minister said: "““We do not believe that the fact that there had been a reduction in the bus operator’s takings would be an admissible objection””.—[Official Report, 6/12/07; col. GC 88.]" There seems a potential conflict between my noble friend’s statement in Committee and the wording of the draft guidance. Even were that potential guidance resolved, the local transport authorities—the promoters of the statutory quality partnership—would still not be party to the appeals process. Thus a non-elected body, the local traffic commissioner, would be able to veto key elements of a statutory quality partnership. He would be able to do this on the basis of a broadly based right of objection from commercial operators, without any reference to the locally accountable transport authority, including any liability by the local transport authority to challenge financial information from operators provided to the appeals body in support of their case. With the threat of such a veto over which the LTA has no influence, the attraction of the statutory quality partnership option to local transport authorities is reduced. In addition, by extending the right to object beyond those operators directly affected by the statutory quality partnership, there is the risk of an operator who does not operate the statutory quality partnership services being able to object and to veto a quality partnership that the LTA and incumbent operator have developed and accepted. If a local transport authority is to pursue, for example, a bus priority scheme, which can often be pretty controversial locally, a guarantee of regular clock-face frequency and caps on fares for those services which will use the bus priority lane are helpful incentives from the local transport authority perspective. As we know, there has only been one statutory quality partnership scheme under the 2000 Act. That is one reason why we have this Bill today. What is needed is a radical overhaul of the arrangement, and not the measures proposed in this Bill. The Government have agreed that it is ““highly unlikely”” that a local transport authority would promote an unreasonable statutory quality partnership, and bus operators are under no obligation to operate within a statutory quality partnership in the first place if they consider it unreasonable. There is then no need for the admissible objection veto on the specification of maximum fares, frequencies and timings, which could add many months of unnecessary and costly delay. This amendment would remove that veto, restore the position to the Government’s own thinking in the draft Bill, and mean that the public sector—including local transport authorities, which provide a significant part of bus-operator income through concessionary fares, tendered services and fuel rebate—would be able to have a real influence over the level and frequency of services that its money is supporting. I beg to move.