Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

In the time available, I will go through the various amendments. However, I do not propose to go through them in fine detail, not least because, as hon. Members who are present know, we have already debated them in great detail in Committee. They were also debated in equal detail in another place. However, I will first set out the Government's response to the amendments and, secondly, explain the need for the amendments that we tabled. One of the key issues that we discussed in some detail during the Bill's passage is the appropriate standard of proof that should apply to the orders. Amendments Nos. 63, 64, 75 and 76 all touch on that. We debated those amendments at length in Committee, but I accept that hon. Members feel that the point is central to the debate. However, I hope that they will forgive me when I say that I have not changed my mind since then, and that the same arguments for not accepting the amendments continue to apply. I am afraid that I must resist them. Clause 1 provides an effective and appropriate test to be met by the applicant authority before an order will be granted by the High Court. The test will not be easy to fulfil—and it should not be. It balances the need to protect the rights of the individual with that to protect the public from the harm that some individuals cause. That is the point to which the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) alluded. There is always a debate about balance and where to draw the line. It is a perennial debate, which has gone on for centuries and will doubtless continue for centuries. They are not about punishing past actions, but preventing future engagement in activities that cause harm to society. For that reason, clause 1 sets out a two-part test that must be met before an order is made by the High Court. The first part of the test is a question of fact: has the proposed subject of the order been involved in serious crime in the past? The second part is a matter of judgment for the court: does it have reasonable grounds for believing that the order will prevent future harm caused by serious crime? Amendments Nos. 63 and 64 would change the required standard of proof to be discharged in relation to the first limb of the test in clause 1 from the civil standard to the criminal standard of ““beyond reasonable doubt””. The appropriate standard of proof for the orders was debated at great length in Committee, as I have said, and in another place. As can be seen from the Hansard report, there was some initial confusion over what having the civil standard of proof would mean in practice. I tried to clarify that in Committee, but I will attempt to do so again. The civil standard of proof is a flexible one—I shall come to the right hon. Gentleman's point in a moment. In the case of McCann, the House of Lords decided that for antisocial behaviour orders the standard of proof that the court should apply when deciding whether a person had acted in an antisocial manner should be the same as the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt. To be clear, Lord Steyn said in that case:"““Lord Bingham of Cornhill has observed that the heightened civil standard and the criminal standard are””—" I emphasise the next word—"““virtually indistinguishable. I do not disagree with any of these views. But in my view pragmatism dictates that the task of the magistrates should be made more straightforward by ruling that they must in all cases under section 1 apply the criminal standard.””" We expect similar principles to be applied in relation to orders. We expect the standard of proof in relation to whether a person has been involved in serious crime to be beyond reasonable doubt. The orders are civil orders, so it is right that the civil standard of proof should apply. As a result, I must resist the amendment.