Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

I shall begin with new clause 3. Under the civil recovery provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002—POCA—it is not possible at an interim stage for there to be a receiver whose only function is to manage property while it is frozen. That is a problem because there are civil recovery cases in which a property freezing order, which only freezes property, is not enough, as the property cannot be managed. On the other hand, obtaining an interim receiving order, which freezes assets and requires the appointment of an independent receiver, would be too much and is unnecessary in some cases. That is because the independent receiver, known as an interim receiver, has management, investigation and reporting functions. Due to the investigative function, it is only right that the interim receiver should be independent from either party to the civil recovery proceedings, so that accusations of any bias in the case can be avoided. There is an identified operational need to create a new type of receiver whose only role is to manage property. Such a receiver would not have any investigatory or reporting functions; he or she could be a member of the staff of an enforcement authority, such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency. In the Government's view, the creation of a civil recovery management receiver will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil recovery regime in the 2002 Act. It will result in significant savings as the primary expense in civil recovery cases is meeting the remuneration and expenses of an interim receiver. In particular, in-house management receivers would be much more cost-effective. The Assets Recovery Agency has a number of cases where the sums spent on the interim receivership already exceed the value of the assets it is pursuing. Such experience has inevitable consequences in terms of whether an enforcement authority would adopt a particular difficult case, which is likely to be protracted and therefore expensive, or opt for a lower-value and less complex case. We want to minimise such a resource consideration in the decision-making exercise of an enforcement authority on whether it should adopt a case for civil recovery. Other minor amendments are consequential on new clause 3. The other amendments in this group, which are also designed to support amendments that the Bill already makes to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, relate to the disclosure of information and the delegation of the functions of the directors of the main prosecution agencies. Amendments Nos. 27 to 32, 35, 37 to 40, 49, 50 and 52 relate to the disclosure of information between the various agencies involved in the civil recovery of the proceeds of crime.