Serious Crime Bill [Lords]

The first thing to note about new clause 1 and the accompanying new clause 2 is that they are obviously very late in consideration. Given what the Minister has said about their importance and necessity, it is surprising that we are considering these proposals on Report—after the entirety of the Bill has already been examined. I acknowledge what the Minister has said about the complexity of what is involved. I accept that in serious and organised crime, criminals will go to great lengths to ensure that their true purpose is disguised and that different corporate structures may be used to try to hide criminal activity. On the face of it, whatever the merits of serious crime prevention orders—we will come on to debate them later—if they are to apply and be effective, there is clearly a need for monitoring to ensure that their terms are adhered to. Without proper monitoring the orders will be ineffective, because it will not be known whether they have been breached and whether the appropriate sanctions should apply. I realise that the position is complex and that on the face of it there is a need for experts to be involved, but the new clause leaves a good deal of room for improvement. I want to raise a few points on which I have sought elucidation from the Minister. The key point is that, while a person or corporate body subject to a serious crime prevention order would need to appear before a court, that person or body would not necessarily have committed a serious offence, but would only have had to be involved in a serious crime. We shall discuss that more fully during our wider debate on the orders themselves. It might be said that involvement in a serious crime indicated a direct link and was therefore extremely important, but the wording of the Bill suggests that the link may be somewhat more indirect. Clause 2(1)(b) and (c) make clear that such involvement could include a person's facilitating the commission of a serious offence, or conducting himself"““in a way that was likely to facilitate the commission””" of a serious offence. There is no requirement for intention in those circumstances. Indeed, clause 4(2) imposes what is almost a reverse burden of proof on the person who is potentially subject to an order, who must show that his actions were ““reasonable in the circumstances””. The Minister said that only about 30 orders a year would be issued, and that has been stated consistently and clearly throughout the review of the draft legislation. What is not clear is whether this measure is really about the Mr. Bigs or whether it is likely to be used far more widely than the Minister intends, purely because of the way in which it is drafted. That is worrying in this context and a number of others. Notwithstanding possible assurances that the measure is supposed to be limited and to attack only the very central figures, it could be interpreted as allowing peripheral figures who, despite having no direct intention and no direct knowledge that they have facilitated or been engaged in facilitating serious crime, may find themselves subject to a serious crime prevention order—and, subsequently, to another order requiring them to pay for the monitoring of their compliance with it. That potential injustice leaves me extremely uncomfortable with the ambit of the new clause, despite the Minister's statement that it is intended to focus only on a very small group of corporates, and to ensure that forensic accountants and experts are brought in to aid the monitoring, enforcement and interpretation of the orders. That second aspect—cost—strikes me as extremely important. I have already described the legislation as wide-ranging and potentially draconian. New clause 1(4) states"““A serious crime prevention order which provides for an authorised monitor may require any body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association which is the subject of the order to pay to the law enforcement agency concerned some or all of the costs incurred by the agency under the arrangements with the authorised monitor.””" It goes on to state that payments on account may also be required, which effectively means that payment must be made in advance of the monitoring. As we have heard from the Minister, it is unclear how those costs will be assessed; in essence, they will be drawn in through secondary legislation. It is also unclear how the court will determine those costs and, therefore, the impact on the business concerned. He has tried to point out the protections in new clause 1(7), which is intended to give the courts a particular role in assessing the relevant circumstances, examining"““(a) the means of the body corporate…""(b) the expected size of the costs””." The provision also deals with the effect that the order and the monitoring would have on that body corporate. We do not know what those costs will be, how they will be assessed and how they will be measured. The court will be put in a difficult position in assessing the impact of the order on the body—the company or business—because it will have to undertake a detailed examination and review of the finances, the business and the way that the company operates to assess whether the order would have a particular effect and whether it would risk the bankruptcy, liquidation or winding up of the company. That will be a hard decision for the court to make, particularly given that it will have to make an assessment of costs that may subsequently change. I am sure that the Minister will say that the Government will set out in the order what the compliance should be, what the terms of the order are and therefore why there is a need for monitoring, but difficulties are involved. Given my professional background, I know that sometimes the costs that one is given in advance may not end up being the costs that arise. The monitor—this expert—will have to make a judgment about what is involved and what its own professional costs are likely to be in seeking the order in the first place. The court will be in a difficult position. How will it go about assessing the costs and the impact when it may have limited information on that body corporate? It will clearly not have a full understanding of how that company conducts its business, the pressures on it and the market conditions. This provision could have a significant adverse impact on businesses if a wrong judgment is made, with the best of intentions, based on information that is not complete at the time that a monitoring condition is applied. We could risk creating injustice, particularly if an order is granted against a company whose involvement was peripheral, not intended, not direct and almost without knowledge, even though the court may have been able to show that it should have taken some other action and that is why it is brought within the scope of the serious crime prevention order in the first place. New clause 1(6) deals with the tests for making serious crime prevention orders. The Minister will be familiar with our debates on Second Reading and in Committee about harm reduction versus punishment. He has said on many occasions, as I am sure he will say this afternoon and this evening, that the Bill is only about harm reduction—it is about preventing serious crime—and that it is not about punishment. One can form one's own judgment about whether that is the reality in the Bill, but subsection (6) raises interesting questions that deserve greater scrutiny.