Legal Services Bill [Lords]

That argument can certainly be made, but I am saying that it will not apply to all lawyers in all cases. It might apply to certain lawyers; in some circumstances, a lawyer's practice might negate their suitability for the position. That will not, however, be the case in all instances. The problem with this proposal is that it would create a non-adaptable set of circumstances. That would not be suitable. We have recently had a Prime Minister who was a lawyer, and lawyers can be chairmen of various sorts of organisations, from banks to voluntary agencies. There is no justification for excluding an entire profession from the role of chairman of the legal services board. It is in the public interest that the best person for the job is appointed as chairman, and I see no reason why the best person might not be, for instance, a qualified non-practising lawyer. We shall therefore seek to divide the House on amendment No. 75 at the appropriate time, which will be when we debate a later group of amendments. Government amendment No. 103 would ensure that the chairman of the legal services board must be a lay person for the first five years. Again, we see no justification for that requirement and believe that the chairman should simply be the best person for the job. I note that the Government have withdrawn the amendment, so this point has in effect become irrelevant. Government amendment No. 104 clarifies the fact that the chairman, and not simply ““any subsequent”” chairman, must not carry out reserved legal activities during the appointment. That simply follows on from other points. Let me now turn to what in constitutional terms is the core of the proposed legislation: the appointment and removal of members of the legal services board. We appreciate the Minister accepting that her position in Committee—that the simple reliance on Nolan principles to ensure that appointments to the board are made independently of Government—was insufficient. Appointments to the board being made by the Lord Chancellor alone could have had serious implications. It would have meant that a senior member of the Executive would have had the ultimate responsibility for governing how the legal profession was regulated. Such a structure could have dramatically undermined the crucial principle of the independence of the legal services board from Government. I am glad that the Minister has changed the Government's stance, adopted in Committee, of simply tabling amendments to wreck what we felt was the good work carried out in the other place, and that she has instead come back with the constructive suggestion, contained in Government amendments Nos. 102 and 106, that appointments and removals from the legal services board be made following consultation with the Lord Chief Justice. I spoke at some length in Committee about the serious concerns of many groups about the potential effect on the legal profession's independence if the Lord Chancellor could make appointments to the LSB alone. The Government appear finally to have listened to the views of the legal profession, the Law Society, the Bar Council, other regulators—both national and, I have to say, international—Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Cross-Bench peers, who amended the Bill in the House of Lords to ensure that a check exists on the Lord Chancellor's power to make appointments to the LSB. However, I still question whether the Government's amendments go far enough to protect the legal profession's independence. I still believe that ideally, the Lord Chief Justice's concurrence would be the most appropriate check on the Lord Chancellor's powers. It is for that reason that my hon. Friends and I tabled amendments Nos. 24 to 34. The Law Society has expressed concerns about the position under the Government amendments, which provide only for ““consultation”” with the Lord Chief Justice. In a letter to Lord Kingsland of 10 September, the Law Society stated:"““We think it is important that the Government should make it clear that 'consultation' will amount to much more than merely inviting the Lord Chief Justice to comment on a list of names of those the Lord Chancellor proposes to appoint. Consultation should cover all aspects of the appointment process. In particular, the Lord Chancellor should consult the Lord Chief ""Justice about the specification of the skills and experience required of the Chair and other members of the Legal Services Board, and also about the composition of the panel which will interview candidates.””" I very much hope that the Minister can provide such assurances to address the Law Society's concerns, which we share. However, requiring appointments to be made with the Lord Chief Justice's concurrence would ensure that his or her opinion was given sufficient sway, and that appointments were wholly independent of Government influence. Indeed, we say that this requirement for concurrence is the best protection to bolster the independence of the legal profession from the Government. Simple consultation, with no clarification of what it will involve, does not go far enough on such an important issue. An independent legal profession provides the ultimate safeguard to the rights of the individual against abuse of power by the state. Lord Woolf, the former Lord Chief Justice, has wisely pointed out that"““the independence of our judiciary is dependent on the independence of our legal profession.””—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 April 2007; Vol. 691, c. 52.]" Simply requiring consultation with the Lord Chief Justice may, in some circumstances, not be sufficient to ensure that any doubt about the independence of the legal profession is removed. In discussions with the Minister, which were certainly helpful, the question was raised of using a parliamentary confirmation hearing for appointments to the LSB, along the lines announced by the Prime Minister in relation to senior appointments. The Minister stated that she would look into the possibility of using such hearings, and I should be pleased to hear her views on that in relation to all board appointments, or just chairman appointments. I point out, however, that even if such hearings were put in place, they might not go far enough to protect the legal profession's independence. The Lord Chancellor would not need to listen to any recommendations, and could be seen to be following unchecked some form of political agenda in relation to the appointment of the board. It does not matter how much consultation with the Lord Chief Justice or a parliamentary Committee takes place if it is simply ignored. For this reason, we still see the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice as the ideal. The position under the Government's amendments is that simple ““consultation”” would suffice. This issue must be addressed again if consultation is ever to be sufficient. At the very least, written guidelines on what that consultation will involve must be provided. For instance, is it agreed that the Lord Chief Justice's views on appointments to the legal services board should be publishable? We are not yet there on these vital provisions. The concurrence position was that agreed by all Opposition Members and passed in the other place. That is where it will go again, as would be the case in any event, because it is essentially the amendment from the other place that this House has turned down. The Government will have difficulties unless much more fat is placed on the bones of their concession. On that basis, I shall ask for a Division at the appropriate time in these proceedings to allow hon. Members to vote for concurrence on amendment No. 24.