Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I beg to move,"That this House insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments Nos. 2,3,5,6 and 10; does not insist on its Amendments 10K to ION in lieu but disagrees with the Lords in their Amendments 10P and 10Q in lieu of those amendments; and proposes Government amendments (a) to (j) in lieu." For the benefit of Members who may be wondering on which piece of paper to find the amendments—I understand the concern of the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), who has, as ever, been assiduous—they are on page 1663, as amended. As the rubric states, that is"““due to the omission of a word in the Government motion.””" Members—particularly those who have been debating it at some length—are familiar with the history of the Bill. We tabled it because we thought it important that there should be offences in respect of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide. We have already accepted in principle the difference—which I shall explain shortly—between our amendment 10A, rejected in the other place, and the amendments that we are about to discuss. The basis of last week’s debate—which was dealt with by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), and for almost all of which I was present—was not whether the Government had accepted the principle of the application of the offence to deaths in custody, but whether we would ensure that that principle was exercised at some reasonable time in the future. The difference involved is significant. I understand the objection that was raised. While doubts may be expressed and debating points made about the time that it has taken to travel this road to Damascus, at least we are on track now. The objection to the wording of amendment 10A lay in the fact that the provision for the Act to extend to deaths in custody—as it will—was discretionary, and was in the hands of the Secretary of State. The amendment stated "““The Secretary of State may by order make amendments””" to the law. It also stated what those amendments could cover, and proposed that the order should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Amendment (a) states that"““a duty is owed to a person who, by reason of being a person within subsection (1A), is someone for whose safety the organisation is responsible””." Subsection (1A) defines the different categories of custody. Amendment (b) defines a custodial institution, in a very wide sense, and a detained person. It also gives other definitions. Also, there is under amendment (h) the power to extend, but never to subtract from, the scope of custody as laid down by what will become section 2(1A). By order, that section will be able to"““include any category of person (not already included)””." In both cases, that must be done by affirmative procedure. That is a significant change. Members of this House and the other place might argue about whether it is sufficient, and I will deal with the vexed issue of timing, but there is a significant difference between where we were and where we are now. It is clear—not least in respect of the civil injuries compensation measures of a few years ago—that where a Bill is extended by inserting the word ““shall”” instead of ““may”” legitimate and understandable expectations may arise that the measures concerned must be exercised. Neither I nor any other Minister proposes to add this duty to the Bill with the cynical idea that it will not be activated. I now wish to address the anxieties that were abroad—