Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill

I have not said anything about not accepting or accepting amendments. The noble Lord has asked me to explore the nature of making legislation. In this Bill we are trying to set up a framework to create a discipline so that something will happen and voluntary local area agreements will apply in every local area. The agreements will be able to deliver what local people want, aspire to and need without compromising or reducing flexibility and without creating a superstructure. That is why the Bill is framed in terms of the balance I have described. Amendment No. 208 is interesting and would have a significant negative consequence. It concerns the definition of ““Secretary of State””. Its immediate effect would be to remove Jobcentre Plus and the Highways Agency from the list of named partners. Those bodies do not have a legal status independent of the Secretary of State, which is why they are named in the Bill in terms of the Secretary of State exercising certain functions. The Secretary of State exercising his functions under Section 2 of the Employment and Training Act 1973 is in fact Jobcentre Plus. When he exercises his functions as a highway or traffic authority, he is in fact the Highways Agency. This is a conflation which is represented by the term ““Secretary of State””. I am sure we all agree that we do not want to remove these organisations, because that would not be desirable. In their place would be a power for the Secretary of State with responsibility for local government to add any other Secretary of State to the list of named partners. The outcome would be to require decisions on individual targets that are related in some way to the functions of relevant government departments to be agreed with central government from the outset. But as I have said, it is vital that those priorities are reached by the local partners themselves. It would also be unworkable because central government departments would be bound to have regard to every individual LAA target that related to them and to which they had signed up. Again, that would not make any sense. Lastly, by naming individual Secretaries of State as partnering authorities, we would be positioning individual departments as needing to agree targets unilaterally when doing so on a collective basis. That is the opposite of what noble Lords want. Instead, as I have explained, we have a shared set of indicators—200 not 1,200, which I know noble Lords will be pleased about—to be agreed collectively on core national priorities on an area-by-area basis, which will reflect how they are to work, and to develop that framework in a collaborative way. I am happy to confirm that important and positive steps are being taken in all these areas. The set of 200 indicators is now being negotiated across Whitehall and will be announced this autumn. We are currently running feasibility testing of the new LAA model in 17 local authority areas by means of negotiation. That is why I quoted the case in Suffolk, which is aiming to simulate the negotiation process that will be conducted for real in the autumn to identify its benefits. Amendments Nos. 209BA and 209ZBA deal with the arrangements for initiating an LAA. Amendment No. 209BA would allow a draft LAA to be initiated either at the direction of the Secretary of State or by the responsible local authority itself. Amendment No. 209ZBA would leave this entirely to the discretion of the responsible authority. Clause 108 allows an LAA to be initiated only by the Secretary of State. The reason for this, as with many judgments in government and in partnerships, is that there must be a clear and agreed process and a timetable by which LAAs can be negotiated and signed off. We cannot have a situation where there are competing local area agreements for the same area, one initiated by the local authority and one by the Secretary of State; we cannot have a situation where we cannot guarantee across Whitehall that an LAA will be negotiated and to a particular timetable, not least because, without such a guarantee, there is a real danger that the myriad existing performance and reporting arrangements, which we are all now trying to slim down, will spring up again by default. Clause 108 contains the process of negotiation which we will formally, at the direction of the Secretary of State and as a matter of practice, set out in guidance. We are developing the guidance with the LGA and we will set out the process for negotiation and the timetable for the next round of LAAs. We expect to issue that guidance as soon as possible after the announcement of CSR07, which will, in turn, confirm the approximately 200 national indicators. Amendments Nos. 210C and 210D are very similar. They also deal with the process for initiating LAAs but seek severely to limit the direction-making power of the Secretary of State. The House has reiterated time and again in legislation the dangers of putting too much power in the hands of the Secretary of State, and we know the nature of such debates. I understand those concerns, but subsections (5) and (6) are proportionate and necessary to make sure that these new and entirely devolutionary LAAs can be made to work. Amendment No. 210C would mean that, where the Secretary of State issued a direction to an authority to prepare an LAA, he could not set a date by which it had to be submitted. How much would that weaken the direction? The preparation would be open-ended and might never be concluded. Amendment No. 210D would ensure that a direction issued by the Secretary of State to prepare an LAA could not be revoked or varied; but these powers are essential because otherwise a local authority could be tied indefinitely into a set of priorities which might change. If the Secretary of State could not revoke a direction he would not be able to deal with any emergencies which might arise—flooding, for example. My noble friend has withdrawn his amendments so I will turn to Amendment No. 212EA, which also seeks to diminish the role of the Secretary of State. It reduces the extent to which an LAA can generally be seen as an agreement because a revision proposal would no longer have to be submitted as is provided for in Clause 113(1)(a). It would have a similar impact; it would not allow the Secretary of State to require a revision. Both amendments would compel the Secretary of State, having signed off an LAA, to live with that agreement for three years with no scope to amend. However, let us consider what might happen if a big local employer collapsed or there was an environmental disaster. You would be unable to address the situation through your LAA because there would be no scope for revision. I hope I have made myself clear on that. Amendment No. 211C deals with the local implications of LAAs. It seeks to ensure that responsible local authorities and partner authorities have more regard to local improvement targets in the LAA in the exercise of their functions over and above the regard that they would pay to other targets. I understand and agree that we want local improvement targets to be taken very seriously by partners, but we have to consider how that would work. I mentioned flooding as an example. It would be inappropriate for the Environment Agency or the fire authorities to be required to have more regard to LAA targets than to dealing with basic emergency situations. One needs to build in flexibility. I am persuaded that we have the balance right in Clause 110. The duty to have regard will ensure that authorities will have to take account of LAA targets but, if there is good reason for not doing so, they will be able to have them revised. I hope noble Lords are reassured by this explanation of the negotiation process—I may be being optimistic—and understand where we are coming from and what we have tried to put in place to ensure that this is successful from the local authority’s point of view.