My Lords, we have already discussed in some detail the appropriate standard of proof for the orders and I hope that I have set out with a degree of clarity how the process of how the orders are made will operate. What I said at that point will provide some context for the discussions in relation to these amendments.
Amendments Nos. 37 and 38 would change the rules on admissibility of evidence in proceedings relating to an order from those applicable in civil proceedings to those applicable in relation to trial on indictment. What the noble Lord says is right in relation to the difference in the nature of evidence that could be used. They also provide that in proceedings for an order a person cannot be required to answer any question or produce any document that he could not be required to answer or produce at such a trial.
The court already has a comprehensive power to manage the cases and the evidence before it and will disregard anything that it considers is inappropriate to be taken into account. These are civil orders and we believe it is appropriate, therefore, that the rules of evidence which apply are the usual civil rules, rather than creating an unusual hybrid approach solelyfor these orders. For these reasons we resist the amendment.
There are safeguards inherent in the process that I have outlined. Specific safeguards are contained in the rules in the High Court, as the noble Lord will know. The proceedings before the High Court will be civil proceedings and all the normal rules of evidence will apply. For example, Clause 34(3)(a) makes itclear that the Crown Court will not be limited to considering evidence that would have been admissible during the criminal proceedings at which the respondent was convicted. This means that hearsay evidence will in principle be admissible during an application for a serious crime prevention order. However, adducing such evidence will be accompanied by the usual safeguards set out in the Civil Evidence Act 1995. These safeguards include the need to give notice in certain circumstances of the intention to adduce hearsay evidence; the possibility of calling the person who made the statement for cross-examination; the application of special considerations when the court determines what weight, if any, to give to the hearsay evidence; and the application of rules relating to competence and credibility.
Noble Lords can, therefore, be assured that the respondent to an application for a serious crime prevention order will be in the same position as any other person facing an application for a court order. In addition, due to the nature of the cases in which applications for serious crime prevention orders are likely to be made, it is unlikely that hearsay will beany more than a limited part of the case that willbe presented to the court by the relevant applicant authority. The court is very familiar with attributing weight to evidence depending on its quality and nature. The reason for this is that often law enforcement officers will be able to give evidence of a person’s activities and the purpose of those activities from their own knowledge rather than having to rely on information from members of the public. So we think that there is a very solid base here.
I hope that now that I have spoken into the record all the safeguards that the noble Lord would wish there to be, he is reassured.
Serious Crime Bill [HL]
Proceeding contribution from
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 25 April 2007.
It occurred during Debate on bills on Serious Crime Bill [HL].
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2006-07Chamber / Committee
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