Serious Crime Bill [HL]

My Lords, I do not have the table from which those figures were adduced, but I can certainly find them. The important thing is that this goes to the noble and learned Lord’s point that this sort of evidence is useful and should be used. He suggested that Australia was an example of where intercept evidence had been used to that purpose. Therefore, I thought it was important for us to have the facts about the accuracy of that assertion. We now do so. The Australian figures of course were of interest. But we know that overseas jurisdictions have, asthe noble Baroness, Lady Park, indicated, a different structure from our own. Their use of intercept evidence, and the way in which they protect sensitive capabilities, differs. They wall off the more sophisticated work of their intelligence agencies, which is not produced in evidence, from the more straightforward interception work conducted by their law enforcement. We could do that, too. We have not done so because in the United Kingdom our intelligence agencies work hand in hand with law enforcement and the access to sophisticated capabilities this promotes has served us very well. Once you dismantle the protections on intercept material, you dismantle the protections for all intercept material. That requires replacement safeguards to be put in place, and that is what we are working really hard to try to develop. I take up the issued raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe. It has been said that if only the prosecution can decide whether it can in each case provide intercept evidence, surely that will suffice. That song has been echoed by the noble Lord, Thomas of Gresford. It is not likely to be ECHR compatible because there has to be a right to a fair trial. That—I hope the noble and learned Lord would think—would undermine the efficacy of that as a way forward. I had wanted to keep my speech short because these issues have been trailed so often. However, it is only right to say that in many of our previous debates on these proposals I have explained why intercept evidence would not be effective against terrorist targets; why it would not obviate the need for control orders; why it is very different from eavesdropping evidence; why any gains against serious crimewould be modest and time limited; why our countryis different from others which do not use intercept evidence; and why technology changes, in communications and the ability to intercept, is so crucial. I have also set out why the Government's view is and continues to be that we have to work on the issue. I do not propose to go through all the fine details. I know that the noble and learned Lord has been invited to come and see the work we are doing. I really want to underline what was said by my noble and learned friend Lord Boyd. This is not because ofany lack of will. Considerable efforts are being undertaken on a continuous basis to address the issue, and we are determined to pursue the matter. I now come to a stage where I am almost going to beg the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to accept our bone fides on this issue. This is not implacable hostility. This is not obdurate or obstinate opposition for opposition’s sake. There is no resistance to doing this—and I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Henley of that—because we are antipathetic to this move as a matter of principle. That could not be further from the case. But I have to tell the House that this Government will not move to introduce information on intercept which is likelyto cause damage to the security of our nation. We will not move. Unless and until we determine a way in which that can be safely used, from this Dispatch Box the House will receive the same response. If, through ingenuity and hard work, we are able to resolve the problem, I will with joy return to the Dispatch Box to explore how it has been done. Until that stage, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment and to be content that he has ensured that our efforts will continue at a heightened level.