Statistics and Registration Service Bill

moved Amendment No. 2: 2: Clause 3, page 1, line 15, leave out ““executive and”” The noble Baroness said: I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 3 and 20. The amendments continue the theme of examining whether the constitutional model for the Statistics Board set out in the Bill is the best one for creating the environment in which trust in statistics can flourish again. They challenge whether the model of a mixed executive and non-executive board is the correct one, and would create a board composed entirely of non-executive members. This does not change the Bill’s basic approach, which is to have a non-ministerial government department, a National Statistician, and an executive office within the board to replicate what is currently found in the Office for National Statistics. The amendments are designed to move to a structure that more clearly recognisesthe supervisory or regulatory functions created by the Bill, and the executive or operational functions in the Bill. A later group of amendments, led by Amendment No. 30, allows us to explore the detail of the separation of functions between the board and the National Statistician, and are an essential accompaniment to these amendments. I want to be clear that I do not seek to minimise the role or status of the National Statistician. Indeed, we have a great desire to enhance the role of the National Statistician as we go through the Bill. Although the National Statistician would no longer be a member of the board, nor would any of his or her executive colleagues, so the board would have a clear oversight function. We would leave completely intact the National Statistician’s role as the board’s adviser on statistics, as provided by Clause 28. It is pretty clear that the board would expect the National Statistician to attend all board meetings, except of course when the board specifically appraises the work of the National Statistician. The fact that the National Statistician remains a part of the board while the board appraises his or her work is one of the Bill’s problems. I mentioned earlier that, so far as I could ascertain, the Statistics Board that is being created is the only example of a non-ministerial department with explicit regulatory as well as operational functions. It is exactly that form of internal conflict that led to the separation of executive and non-executive functions in the BBC, with the non-executive functions being discharged by the BBC Trust. As with our concept for the National Statistician, the role of the director-general of the BBC remains undiminished by the new structural arrangements in the BBC. Arguably, that role would be enhanced because it gives clear operational leadership to the senior executive in the structure. The unitary board model of mixing executives and non-executives was created in the private sector for commercial bodies. It has evolved, particularly inthe UK, to a general understanding now enshrined in the corporate governance code, which is overseenby the Financial Reporting Council, that at least half the members of boards of directors, excluding the chairman, are non-executives. This is designed to provide an environment in which entrepreneurialism and profit maximisation can flourish, while providing checks and balances on behalf of the interests of shareholders overall. The mixed model of executives and non-executives serves the business community well, but we should be wary of assuming that it is the only model for a corporate body. I am sure that it also works well for public bodies that operate on commercial lines, although there are relatively few of them left in the public sector. It might seem to work quite well in some of the newer regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Services Authority and Ofgem, but there have been no studies, so far as I am aware, of the detailed ways in which those boards work. The fact that they are mixed executive and non-executive does not mean that they operate in line with the private sector model, as found in the combined code. Of course, relatively few bodies combine regulatory and operational functions. Indeed, I am not sure that there are many beyond the BBC. So we cannot assume that the model in this Bill produces the right result. I hope that the Minister will answer a few questions which are relevant to this issue. Will he describe how the Government see the role of the chairman developing? They announced last week that the search for the chairman would begin this month, and so there must be a detailed specification. Will the Minister make it available to the Committee? Will the chairman be expected to report publicly on the work of the National Statistician? What will happen to the functioning of the unitary board if the chairman and the other non-executives disagree with the National Statistician? We see a potential issue also in the nature of the chairman. I believe it has been said that the role is seen as a significant one which should attract a heavyweight candidate. That gives comfort to those who want a champion for statistics within Whitehall—someone who can kick up a fuss, for example, if resources for statistics are insufficient or if there is non-compliance with the code. But the bigger that role is within a unitary board, the smaller will be the role of the National Statistician, especially if the chairman has a head of assessment overseeing the work of the National Statistician. I think the Minister will agree that when two large roles are found on one board, they cannot both be top dog. As I have said, we want the role and status of the National Statistician to be enhanced, so his or her role in relation to the chairman is important. In Clause 29 the Bill provides that the National Statistician is to be the chief executive of the board, but it is unclear exactly what that is intended to convey. Will the Minister explain what the Government mean by that, and how they see the relative roles of the chairman and chief executive playing out? These issues are important because the Government have decided on a unitary structure for the board. Currently there is no confusion between the roles of the chairman of the Statistics Commission and the National Statistician, but throwing the two roles into one board creates a huge potential for confusion or worse. I am concerned that the apparent tidiness of the unitary corporate model will not serve our statistics arrangements well. We ought to pause to see whether there is a better structure which will enhance trust in statistics. I beg to move.