Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, for exploring the issues as they have. I absolutely accept that the noble Baroness is trying to achieve clarity in understanding better how the provisions will work and whether it will be possible to make inappropriate extensions contrary to that which we have already said. I understand that her proposal to remove new Section 32G should be read in that context. Although the list given in new Section 32G(2)— "““to assist in the prevention and detection of crime (other than fraud) … to assist in the apprehension and prosecution of offenders … to assist in the recovery of debt owing to public bodies””—" is an illustration, I hope that it demonstrates the potential value of leaving open the possibility of extending the scope of the valuable tool providedby the national fraud initiative. I thank the noble Baroness for indicating that she accepts the value of that initiative. She and other noble Lords have made that clear throughout, so we are at one. This effective tool for identifying irregularities through data matching could, for example, have a potential role in identifying convicted sex offenders who are working with vulnerable adults and children. The noble Baroness will know that the names of those working with children or vulnerable adults can be checked against the sex offenders register and List 99. However, current checks are expensive and not as effective as they should be. Given the comments made so often in this Chamber, I cannot imagine that any noble Lord would want to discard a potential method of identifying those working with vulnerable people who should have been prevented from doing so. Of a different level of potential seriousness, but none the less important, the national fraud initiative should, subject to parliamentary approval, be allowed to help recover public debt from persons who have left without making payment or giving any forwarding address. I do not believe that we should close the doors to such possibilities now. The national fraud initiative requires only a limited amount of information from each data set that is held by a body. It does not indiscriminately swallow vast amounts of personal data in a way which may cause prejudice to innocent people. Instead, it carefully matches only the relevant information which has the potential to uncover where fraud, or possibly in the future, other crimes or irregularities, may have occurred. It should also be remembered that the powerto add the new purposes will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure of both Houses. Of course, I hear what the noble Baroness says about that, but she and I have experienced this House’s increasing willingness to challenge, and its ability to do so when that is right and proper. I have never been slow to accept the reality of that position. One of the beauties of adding additional issues to the list by way of affirmative resolution is that the House has an opportunity to say ““yea”” or ““nay”” to such a change. The process is an increasingly powerful one and one which this House has not hesitated to take recently. I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, said—that this House, and increasingly the other place are working hard together, particularly on these issues, to find sensible resolutions to problems. I have the happy advantage of having worked with the noble Baroness on so many Bills that they are too bountiful to recall, though some stand out with glowing memory. This is a very important safeguard, ensuring that any new purposes are appropriate and justified. Amendment No. 116 offers an alternative to limiting these further purposes, which would extend the national fraud initiative powers beyond fraud only where it relates to the prevention and detection of serious offences as defined by Schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Although it is certainly possible that data matching might assist in preventing and detecting these crimes, Schedule 1 does not set out an appropriate list by which to constrain the types of crime contemplatedin extending the purposes of the national fraud initiative. Schedule 1 would not enable the commission to undertake data matching to identify where convicted sex offenders may have wrongfully gained employment working with vulnerable people. Nor would the commission be able to undertakedata matching for the purpose of identifying the whereabouts of individuals who have absconded, leaving behind public sector debt, such as tenant rent-arrears owed to a local authority. Regrettably, the indications are that these sums are substantial. It is important to remember not only what the national fraud initiative tool can do but also what it cannot and what it is not. The Audit Commission has no intention or need to use this tool invasively to look into the lives of the law-abiding public or to extend this tool to private companies to collect debt owed by customers. The national fraud initiative is a flexible tool that could be adapted to serve the public interest—I emphasise, the public interest—not only in preventing and detecting fraud, as the Bill currently does, but in other areas, too, subject to Parliament’s future approval. The noble Baroness mentioned the assurances we gave on the national identity register. Those hold true. The intention would be only to use the register to identify crime where a specific provision was made in the law introducing it, or where the Government had decided not to do so because its use would be voluntary. The Audit Commission would wish to use the register only for serious crime, in any event. I do not believe that there is any dissonance between the position that we explored when we discussed the national identity register and the current position. The noble Baroness’s Amendment No. 117 would have the effect of removing the power to add bodies subject to mandatory participation in the national fraud initiative. Currently, only bodies subject to audit and inspection by the Audit Commissionare included on the mandatory list. Over time, reorganisations occur and governance and accountability can change at a local level. This clause allows the national fraud initiative to be flexible to such potential changes and, thereby, to keep pace with the developing ways in which criminals endeavour to take advantage of the public sector. Again, it should be noted that this power is subject to the affirmative procedure in both Houses. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, are concerned about the apparent elasticity in this clause, but I hope I have gone some way to explain why it is essential that the national fraud initiative has flexible and appropriate powers at its disposal. The noble Baroness pressed me on the justification for the further extensions. I hope that I have been able to persuade her that we require a flexible tool that can be used where needed and can allow cross-border matching. For example, we cannot now match between northern England and southern Scotland, which leaves a loophole for fraudsters to exploit. I am confident that neither the noble Baroness nor the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, would wish that to continue. On the identification of people who wish to take part in the policy forum, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, giving that purpose to the Audit Commission could not be justified. He does not need to worry about that. I hope that I have said enough to reassure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord that we do not need to return to these issues, but I accept that the noble Baroness will want to look carefully at what I have said, in addition to the issues that we explored in previous amendments. I accept that once she has done that, she may well wish to come back and hone any further amendments on Report. Before that, I would be very happy to discuss any of those issues with her, if she wished to do so.