Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I shall respond, first, to the whole issue of industry regulation and shall take the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour. It would be over-burdensome to say that all purveyors of such vehicles, who may have legitimate purposes, should give information to the authorities when asked. Indeed, I think that these vehicles are sometimes used by jewellers to convey articles from one place to another, which is a legitimate purpose. If you regulated the whole industry, you would put a huge burden on the 99 per cent of businesses that behave entirely appropriately. That would be unfair, unjust and over-burdensome. This provision seeks to target individual businesses which have failed and/or refused to participate in an appropriate way—thankfully, they are still a relatively small minority— and where there is cogent evidence from the authorities that their facilities are being used by serious criminals in a way that inures to the disadvantage of the community and the safety of all. So we think that targeting will make the approach more proportionate. I have already said that it is our view that someone who has a reasonable excuse will not be in danger. It is a two-staged process. First, the agencies that will operate the orders and will be entitled to apply for them have to deal with a very targeted group engaging in serious criminal activity whom we are seeking to interdict. Therefore, there is always an issue of capacity and of targeting that which is likely to reduce the crime most effectively; in other words, you have to target the relevant people. Thus, the first test will be the agency identifying those to whom the order should apply. The next test will be undertaken by the legal team which will represent them in relation to these orders, and it will ensure that it is satisfied that an application is more likely than not to succeed. The third test will then be carried out, which, in effect, will be the judgment by the court. We hope that if someone has a reasonable excuse for their activity, they will share it with the authority investigating that activity. If they fail and/or refuse to share it at that stage, they will then share it with the court, which will be in a position to make a decision about reasonableness. If the court finds that the excuse is reasonable, no order can be made. For the sake of clarity, for which the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns, asked, I shall deal with Amendment No. 12. This amendment relates to the meaning of having been involved in serious crime in England and Wales. The same arguments will apply to each of the other amendments, which relate to the other definitions of ““involved in”” or ““involvement in”” serious crime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and outside England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Clause 2 sets out what constitutes having been involved in serious crime in England and Wales. A person has been involved in serious crime in England and Wales if, first, he has committed a serious offence in England and Wales; secondly, he has facilitated the commission by another person of a serious offence in England and Wales; or, thirdly, he has conducted himself in a way likely to facilitate the commission by himself or another person of a serious offence in England and Wales. It is right to suppose that the majority of the applications will come under the first two provisions, but Amendment No. 12 would remove the third element. As I said, most of the situations in which we see these orders being useful will be those covered by the first two but we believe that there are instances where the third will be appropriate and useful. The majority of instances that we can foresee will relate to either organisations or individuals providing a good or service. That will usually be in a business context but occasionally it might be where someone provides a good or service on an informal basis. The sort of behaviour that we are talking about here is where a person or organisation turns a blind eye to the likely outcome of their actions—something to which the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred. They may not specifically intend to facilitate serious crime, but they are not taking the precautions that we would expect reasonable people to take to ensure that their actions cannot facilitate serious crime, and so their actions help to bring real harm to others. I emphasise that the applicant authority would have to show that the behaviour was ““likely”” to facilitate serious crime, but we do not believe that that is an easy test to meet. We think that the authorities would have to have cogent evidence to satisfy the court that they fell within this criterion. I believe that the test set out in McCann would apply to these provisions. The court would have to be satisfied that the condition was met, and that would mean that the probable outcome of their actions would have to be the facilitation of serious crime. The vast majority of people are able to apprehend the risk of something being the result of their actions where it is probable. This, combined with the exclusion contained in Clause 4(3)(a), under which any action which is reasonable cannot be the basis for an order, provides strong safeguards to those who might inadvertently facilitate serious crime. Finally, when considering which conditions of an order will be proportionate, the court will consider the actions that form the basis of the order. The conditions necessary to prevent future involvement in serious crime are likely to be more light-touch for a person who has facilitated a serious offence, compared with a person who has committed a serious offence. For those reasons, the amendments tabled are unhelpful and unlikely to prevent the harm caused by serious crime, and so we must resist them. I hope that I have been able to better and more adequately explain how the provision will work. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, will be content to withdraw—no, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. The two are so interchangeable that I have made this terrible slip, and I beg both the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and, most keenly, the noble Baroness’s pardon for having so confused them.