Serious Crime Bill [HL]

I absolutely understand the nature of the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy of Lour, and thank her for her sympathy. But we have the examples in the Bill to try to do what the noble Baroness suggests—set the parameters. We are fortunate because the High Court of Justice in our country has, in its inherent jurisdiction, long experience of doing this sort of thing. For example, in wardship, the High Court can do anything to protect a minor from the wrongful removal from a jurisdiction or from harm. In the recent Children Act 2004, we retain—I think in Section 100—the ability to make an order in wardship if all else fails. We have entrusted in the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court the ability for a High Court judge to make proportionate orders that seem to be right in the circumstances of that particular case. So this is not by any means unknown, albeit the noble Baroness is right that in more recent legislation we have tried to set out clear boundaries within which the court should operate and clear rules about how they should apply the tests that we have given them. That is why we have provided the tests in Clause 1 and the parameters which we have just been discussing in this amendment. In terms of proportionality, we also have the Human Rights Act 1998 as a further constraint on their operation. Of course, a court would not be able to make an order that was unreasonable or inconsistent with the Human Rights Act. If they did so, the Court of Appeal and/or the Judicial Committee of the House could strike down any such order. We know from our most recent jurisprudence that the court has been very vigorous in being guardians of the Human Rights Act and making sure that that which is done is compliant. I understand the noble Baroness's concerns, but we believe that we have got the balance about right on this occasion. We must have a little flexibility. Otherwise, to put it colloquially, we will not be able to catch the pernicious crooks fairly.