Serious Crime Bill [HL]

moved Amendment No. 2: 2: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, after ““satisfied”” insert ““beyond reasonable doubt”” The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 4, 87 and 88. The purpose is to tease out what the Government actually have in mind in relation to reasonable doubt. As a result of this amendment, the rules of evidence that apply in criminal proceedings would apply in proceedings relating to serious crime prevention orders. The amendments would also clarify the Government’s intention that a court should be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a person has been involved in serious crime before making an order. The British legal system and post-war human rights framework apply more rigorous fair trial standards to criminal trials than to civil proceedings. This is because a civilised democratic state can only justify using this great force punish an individual if it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the individual has committed an offence and the individual has been given a fair opportunity to defend himself. At Second Reading, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, was eager to counter arguments that serious crime prevention orders were a means of evading the higher fair trial guarantees that apply in criminal proceedings. She said that serious crime prevention orders are, "““civil orders, so this involvement [in serious crime] will have to be proved to a civil standard. But I know that many of your ""Lordships will be only too aware—so I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I emphasise it—that where serious assertions are made, the civil standard can be virtually the same on certain issues as the criminal standard. Recent case law has stated … that in proceedings like these the court will look at the civil standard as a sliding scale, with the likely standard of proof for these orders being very close to the criminal standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’””.—[Official Report, 7/2/07; col. 729.]" We acknowledged that that could be the case. However, it is not by any means certain that the courts would apply this higher standard of proof in serious crime prevention orders proceedings. These amendments would clarify the point and provide the certainty that is rightly sought by many Members of the Committee. The fair trial guarantees in criminal proceedings also go further than a high burden of proof—for example, the general rule against reliance on hearsay evidence. The general requirement that a person is convicted only on the basis of statements made in oral evidence in proceedings was designed to ensure that guilt or innocence is not determined on the basis of unreliable rumour and gossip and to ensure that the suspect has a chance to challenge the evidence against him. It continues to perform a vital function, helping us to ensure that the innocent are not swept up with the guilty and maintaining public faith that our justice system does indeed deliver justice. This is clearly as relevant today as it was in the past. The amendment would ensure that these criminal rules of evidence apply to serious crime prevention order proceedings. I beg to move.