Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill

I might have saved the hon. Gentleman the trouble of intervening if I had made the point that I was about to make, which is that the Government have not changed their mind about the general principle. It sounds as though some Opposition Members have not changed their minds about it, either, but that they see that there might be cause for making a change in particular, narrow cases. A case could certainly be made for a more limited provision that would enable defendants only in serious and complex fraud cases to waive jury trial, and we have given some real thought to that possibility. The provision that we were considering would, like that in the 2003 Bill, have given defendants a right to non-jury trial, subject to veto by a co-defendant who wanted to be tried by jury. We doubt whether it would be practical to require a defendant, as the prosecution must, to satisfy any condition in order to secure non-jury trial, along the lines proposed in new clause 14(5). Our view was that, if jury waiver is to be available, it probably ought to be available on request. For example, if, in order to make the application, the defence had to show in detail that the exposition of its defence was likely to result in a long and complex trial—rather than the evidence being put forward by the prosecution—it might have to expose all the detail and complexity of its argument. If we were to go down this route, a better way to proceed would probably be to give the defence a right to make the application, rather than circumscribing it with various conditions. Having said all that, although I am not disputing the many points that have been made during the debate, there is one issue that weighed quite heavily with me. When we introduced the Bill, we made it clear that we wanted it to deal with an area of law that had a long and particular history relating to Auld and Roskill, and that we did not regard it as a wedge that could be extended to a series of other non-jury trials. I accept that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) would say that he would not seek to use against me an allegation of bad faith if I responded to the Opposition’s request. However, I note that he subsequently went on to argue, despite saying that he would not do so, that there is an inevitable logic in extending the provision once we have got it. He was saying, in effect, that if we accepted the Opposition’s position, we would be accepting the inevitable logic of the provision’s being extended to other areas. He used that argument honestly—I am not implying any other motive—but I point out to him that there is a way of not extending that provision, which is to take the view that one will not do so. Indeed, we have given that commitment. In discussions with the Opposition about introducing such a Bill, we gave various commitments and we have kept to them in good faith and with integrity. We and the Opposition disagree on the basic principle, and we are having that debate. It is important that, insofar as we can, we stick with the faith that we have had with the House that we will bring forward a Bill that deals only with the issue that was in the 2003 Act, that we will listen to the concerns of others and that we will have no further extension of non-jury trials. If we were to accept the new clause, there would probably—although not inevitably—be a certain number of further non-jury trials because a defendant had taken that option. I therefore took the view that we would not make this proposal. Would we ever consider the point again in the future? We have no plan to do so and we do not accept the wedge argument. It is a constitutional principle that no Parliament can bind a future Parliament, so we will have to see what happens in the future, but our position is that the Bill is what we want and this is where we stand.