Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill

That, of course, is not true now, although it was true before the Lord Chancellor met the legitimate—or illegitimate; that is a matter of opinion—aspirations of the judiciary. My understanding is that the judiciary are now happy with what the Lord Chancellor has done, so perhaps my point is better than it would have been six months ago. What the hon. and learned Gentleman is actually saying—and it is a perfectly fair point—is that once we argue for any exception to a jury trial, we are creating a precedent. I understand that argument: it has considerable force, and it is the reason why the hon. and learned Gentleman and I will vote against the Bill on Third Reading. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield suggested, once we open up this can of worms we are driven by logic to extend the class. That, of course, is why we are all against the Bill. However, within the narrow limits of a Bill whose provisions are confined to fraud cases, I think that we are entitled to go where the logic points, provided that what we do is fair within the framework of the Bill. That is my answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I know that we do not entirely agree on this point. Let me now deal with two further categories. The hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey’s point about publicity was entirely right. While applications to stay proceedings on grounds of abuse of process are available to defence counsel, there will be a range of cases in which a defendant might think that the degree of pre-trial publicity is such as to taint the process, although the force of the submission would not be so strong as to secure a stay of proceedings on those grounds. In those circumstances, the defendant might well seek a non-jury trial. My last category, which was canvassed in Committee, is where a defence reveals some dodgy behaviour or unattractive conduct, but that falls short of the offence with which the defendant has been charged. In those circumstances, a defendant might think that a judge alone would be more likely to disregard the unattractive nature of the defence and to direct his or her attention exclusively to the legal merits of the allegation. My point is that there are a range of circumstances—I have no doubt that Members will identify others—in which a defendant might want to make such an application. In new clause 14(5), I have tried to define criteria that meet the totality of the possible circumstances, and it also reinforces the argument that a defendant should be entitled to make an application.