Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for moving the amendments in the very fair terms that he did. He gave notice at Second Reading of his intention to table the amendment along these lines. Although we have given it some thought, it is not something that we feel persuaded or attracted towards, for reasons that I shall set out. Picking up on the point about the history of limitations, my understanding is that the civil law of negligence has recognised the need for a limitation period since 1623—so the noble and learned Lord was right on that point—when apparently the first Limitation Act was passed through Parliament. English criminal law generally proceeds on the basis that there is no restriction on the time that may elapse between the commission of an offence and its prosecution. There are important exceptions to that principle. For example, information charging a summary offence to be tried in a magistrates’ court must be laid within six months of the commission of the offence. Clearly, that does not relate to serious offences such as manslaughter. Clause 1(6) makes the new offence indictable only. The code for Crown prosecutors makes delay a relevant factor when considering whether it is in the public interest that proceedings should be brought. Again, that is specifically disapplied for serious offences, which the new offence will undoubtedly be. At present, there is no limitation period for bringing proceedings of gross negligence manslaughter, either against individuals or against companies. I am reluctant to introduce one in the absence of any specific mischief. Generally, a limitation period in the law of negligence operates to provide some certainty that individuals and companies will not be open to claims for damages for loss many years after the loss was sustained. That puts the general interest in allowing people to reorder their lives and be aware of the extent of their liabilities ahead of the need to provide compensation. However, the interests are weighted differently when the question is one of holding a person to account for the commission of a serious offence. That is not to say that the law is entirely at large here. For example, if there has been a lengthy period between a person’s injury and their death—perhaps in one of the cases alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn—the consent of the Attorney-General may be needed. Although the year-and-a-day rule was abolished some years ago, it was replaced with a requirement that the Attorney's consent be sought where more than three years passed between injury and death. That rule would apply to the new offence. Equally, where very substantial delays have occurred, it might amount to an abuse of process for a prosecution to be brought. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, made that point. In the 1985 case of Bell v DPP of Jamaica, the Privy Council accepted that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to prevent a trial which would be oppressive because of unreasonable delay. It laid down a number of factors to consider, including: the length of delay, the prosecution's reasons to justify the delay, the accused's efforts to assert his rights, and the prejudice caused to the accused. The test, though, is very high: the defendant will need to show that as a result of the delay he will suffer prejudice to the extent that no fair trial can be held. However, that echoes the requirement in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights for a charge to be heard within a reasonable period. I hope therefore that, with those caveats and explanations, I have persuaded the noble and learned Lord that, although I cannot offer him direct comfort that I will accept his amendment, there are means at the courts' disposal to ensure that criminal charges are brought before them promptly. I do not believe that the balance of interests between allowing defendants to move on from a death or injury caused negligently and enabling justice to be secured is the same in the law of negligence as it is in the criminal law, and for that reason we are reluctant to transpose the civil limitation period into the criminal law. I hope that, having heard that, the noble and learned Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.