Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

Clause 15 stipulates that the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the DPP for Northern Ireland, will be needed before corporate manslaughter proceedings can be instituted. In Scotland, all proceedings on indictment are instigated by the Lord Advocate. Therefore, there is no need for a consent mechanism. Requiring the consent of the DPP means that private prosecutions will be able to proceed only if the two-stage test in the code for Crown prosecutors is satisfied; namely, that the state of the evidence is such that there is a realistic prospect of conviction, and that a prosecution would be in the public interest. If the DPP does not consent to prosecution, that decision can be challenged through judicial review. In Committee in another place, there was concern that this requirement effectively prevents private prosecutions. A question was asked whether, if the DPP felt that there was sufficient evidence and a public interest, there might still be some question of whether he would allow the private prosecution. There is no question here. There is no additional factor in the DPP’s decision about whether to give consent, and, if evidential and public interest tests are met, there would be no basis for refusing consent. In the vast majority of cases, there will be no question about public interest; although I should pause to say that there may be some tragic cases where, for example, in the case of a family business and a close relative is killed, the public interest in pursuing a prosecution may be low. But even in these cases the CPS will bring a case if, despite the tragic circumstances, it is in the public interest to do so. In practice, the DPP’s decision on consent will hinge on whether sufficient evidence is available. The CPS must assess the quality and admissibility of evidence and so on, and decide whether it supports a realistic prospect of conviction. That test means that, on the basis of the evidence, a jury, properly directed according to the law, is more likely to convict the defendant of the alleged charge. Where the evidence does not exist to support a realistic prospect of conviction, we do not think that any organisation should face the prospect of a private prosecution. We do not see requiring the DPP’s consent as reducing victims’ access to justice. The Bill ensures cases can get to court and can be considered by the court under a wider test for liability than they currently can. We argue that it is in no one’s interests to see cases go to court where there is no realistic prospect of conviction under the new framework. We believe that the label of manslaughter is and should be taken very seriously; that it should be reserved for the very worse sort of offending; and that its impact on a company convicted of it should be significant. But because we want it to have that effect, and believe it will, we do not want companies that manage health and safety well, but which tragically have a fatal accident, to have their reputations damaged through unfair charges. That is why we believe the DPP should be satisfied in every case that the evidence supports a reasonable prospect of conviction. Given the safeguard that a decision by the DPP not to give consent can always be subject to a judicial review, we do not think that the provision advanced in the amendment should find its way into the Bill. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, about conflicts of interest of the DPP in Crown cases. We do not think that it should be a problem. The DPP is an independent person. It has a highly respected position that carries great integrity. We are entirely confident that the DPP would act independently and quite properly. In answering that point, we have to respect the integrity of the DPP’s position and understand just how that works.