Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I think that the noble Lord is progressing from Amendment No. 89, on which I wish to comment. It does not impose secondary criminal responsibility. The noble Lord’s points about the secondary liability of aiding and abetting had crossed my mind, but there are problems with aiding and abetting that would not apply in the situation that Amendment No. 89 addresses. Amendment No. 89 is a very simple case of a primary liability for causing the failure to comply with the order of the court. It is a primary failure to obey a court order; it is not aiding and abetting the organisation. It is about substantial, direct causation. I agree with the noble Lord that the arguments based on secondary liability have their problems, but, with respect, they do not seem very substantial here. I do not wish to inhibit the progress that the noble Lord has mentioned and I am very grateful that the word has been introduced into the discussions. We look forward to that progress, but—I say this simply to expose a difference between us—the amendment is not based on secondary responsibility.