Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

All the amendments in this group are concerned with ensuring that organisations convicted of the new offence carry out any remedial action ordered by the courts. My noble friend Lady Turner set out very clearly how she believes that should take place. It is important that organisations comply with remedial orders, and to that end we have made the consequences of not complying with an order more serious than was the case in the original draft Bill. Organisations that do not comply with a remedial order will be committing an offence, and will be returned to the Crown Court, where they will be subject to, potentially, an unlimited fine. Amendments Nos. 83 and 88 propose that the courts should be able to go further than that, however, and name an individual who could be guilty of contempt of court if the organisation did not comply with a remedial order. Taking a different approach, Amendment No. 89 proposes to introduce a new form of secondary liability to the offence of non-compliance with a remedial order, with the penalty of an unlimited fine and, in the case of a director, possible disqualification. Like the noble Lord, Lord James, I have some reservations about that approach. Some might feel that naming an individual amounts to threatening to sanction an individual for the faults of the company and would stigmatise that individual without necessarily affecting compliance. The noble Lord, Lord James, went further and suggested that it might be damaging to an exemplary director in all other respects. It may not be necessary to introduce a secondary offence of non-compliance. If failure to comply with a remedial order was clearly attributable to the acts or omissions of a particular individual, the ordinary principles of secondary liability would apply: the individual could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting in the primary offence committed by the organisation. Furthermore, given that directors can be disqualified after conviction for a health and safety offence, disqualification may well also be available in respect of a director convicted of aiding and abetting non-compliance with a remedial order. We are, however, committed to ensuring that remedial orders have their intended effect. It is vital that organisations convicted of corporate manslaughter do whatever is necessary to ensure that the offence will not recur, and if a remedial order is necessary to give effect to that, it must be complied with. I understand the points that my noble friend made in this respect about nominating an individual as responsible for securing compliance. I hope, too, that she understands my reservations and why this does not appear in the Bill. It might be that some progress can be made here, but I do not want to raise expectations that we later cannot fulfil. Amendment No. 83 takes another approach to compliance—