Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

The amendments in this group once again seek to test the Government’s thinking behind amendments made to the Bill in another place. I welcome the opportunity to explain why those changes were made. Amendments Nos. 60, 65, 67 and 71 reverse technical changes made to Clause 6 to avoid needless repetition of the same phrase. Multiple references to, "““circumstances that are believed to be emergency circumstances”” " were removed from the clause and replaced with subsection (8), which provides that every reference to ““emergency circumstances”” within the clause includes a reference to, "““circumstances that are believed to be emergency circumstances””." The amendments would therefore make no substantive change to the Bill. Amendment No. 68 proposes a limitation of the application of the emergency services exemption to NHS bodies in response to concern expressed in another place about the width of the exemption as initially drafted. In particular, it was felt that the exemption could be interpreted to extend to NHS bodies in a very wide range of circumstances; for example, it could apply to the treatment of any patient in immediate danger, whether at the scene of an accident or on a hospital ward. That was not the Government’s intention, so we made changes to the clause, which will be debated in detail in relation to later amendments. In brief, we tightened Clause 6 so that the only treatment decisions that can be covered by the exemption are prioritisation decisions taken in an emergency. So, for example, decisions regarding the order in which patients receive medical attention in an emergency would be exempt. Such decisions are a core element of how NHS personnel manage their responses to an emergency, and we do not think that it would be in the public interest for the threat of criminal liability to distort the way such decisions are made. No other treatment decisions would be exempt, however. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, offers a different route to restricting the application of the exemption to the NHS. It does so by providing that medical treatment cannot benefit from the exemption if it is administered within any kind of healthcare facility. While I see some attractions in this approach, I also think that it potentially leads to some difficult and possibly arbitrary distinctions in terms of what should qualify as a healthcare facility and where the precincts of the healthcare facility would end. For example, is a chiropody service, situated miles away from a casualty department and with no advanced resuscitation equipment, included within the definition of a healthcare facility? Is a hospital car park included? I am not sure whether it would always be clear to providers of healthcare services where the limits of this exemption would lie. Furthermore, we can envisage situations in which emergency circumstances could occur within the precincts of a healthcare facility where the exemption ought to apply. For example, if there were a viral pandemic, hospital staff may need to prioritise responses to those affected. Such a response should not be within the scope merely because it occurs in a hospital. It is for this reason that I prefer the Government’s approach. By making it clear that treatment decisions are not exempt except where they are prioritisation decisions taken in order to manage an emergency, we provide clarity for the emergency services and avoid the risk of defensive practices, which uncertainty might encourage. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.