Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

The amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Cotter, standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, seek to apply the new offence to the emergency services subject to a number of considerations. Before addressing these amendments, I should like to explain why the exemptions provided by Clause 6 are necessary. The purpose of this new offence is to tackle organisations that create risks to the safety of others but do not manage those risks properly. We think that it would extend the concept of manslaughter too far to hold public authorities criminally responsible for their efforts to assist those in danger. Clause 6, therefore, ensures that it is clear that a narrow range of organisations are not liable to prosecution for corporate manslaughter in respect of actions they take in response to emergency circumstances. This means that matters such as the timeliness of the response to an emergency, the level of response and the effectiveness of how the emergency is tackled are excluded from the ambit of the offence. The exemption applies only in terms of the way in which these organisations respond to emergency circumstances as defined in the Bill. Activities that do not form part of the response, such as maintaining vehicles or equipment, are not covered. Therefore, if a vehicle driven at speed to an emergency crashes because its brakes have not been adequately maintained, those circumstances would not be covered by this exemption. Nor does the exemption override duties of care owed by an organisation as an employer or occupier. Thus an authority otherwise benefiting from this exemption would still be under a duty to provide safe systems of work for its employees. For example, it would be required to provide adequate training for employees who are required to drive at speed. The exemption does not generally remove liability from organisations that could currently be prosecuted for manslaughter. In most circumstances the organisations listed would not owe a duty of care in terms of their responses to emergencies, so even without the exemption they would not be subject to this offence. There are some situations in which this would be open to question. This could lead to uncertainty in the emergency services about where their criminal liabilities lie, which could encourage a culture of undue risk aversion in those services. We do not think that that would be in the public interest. We therefore think that there is value in the emergency services and similar organisations being clear about where their criminal liabilities lie, and Clause 6 achieves that. The amendments tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, seek to remove the emergency services exemption and to make those organisations liable for the offence where they owe a duty of care, subject to a number of considerations, which are set out. But, as I have said, in most circumstances the organisations covered by this clause would not owe a duty of care in terms of their response to emergencies. Therefore, the effect of the proposed amendment would in reality be minimal. It would not create liability where organisations do not owe duties of care, but it would create uncertainty, which could well distort operational priorities. We would not want that to be an outcome of the Bill. We also question whether it would be realistic to expect the prosecution to be able to put all the considerations given in Amendment No. 66 before the jury, or fair to expect a jury to be able to make a balanced assessment of complex matters such as other relevant duties owed, resource constraints and public interest considerations when faced with a tragic case. I therefore think that the approach taken in the Bill—to restrict the exemption to tightly defined emergency circumstances—is better. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that the emergency services and similar organisations will be clear about where their criminal liabilities lie.