Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I apologise for coming back again, but we are on such a central issue that it is worth a minute or two. In a way, I was encouraged because I think the Minister is not only seeing my point but is seeing its merit. It is perfectly obvious that none of the points made in Clause 2(1)(c)—duties owed in connection with the supply by the organisation of goods or services, construction, maintenance, commercial activities, the use or keeping of plant, vehicles or other things—are relevant to public policy. In my opening speech, I expressed my doubt about whether we should cut out the points in Clause 3(1) where we are dealing with decisions about matters of public policy. We are focusing on Clause 3(2), and what the Minister has said so far are rather good arguments for omitting it and widening public authority liability in all these sound practical areas where, whether they relate to a public authority or a private business, one is very much in the same position. The Minister used one argument which I did not find terribly attractive—I would accept that he put it charmingly. He said that it might make statutory bodies over-cautious if they thought that the legislation might give rise to charges of corporate manslaughter and they might not permit anything—fire officers are quite often pretty cautious, some people think, but they have a judgment to make. One might equally argue that one should not have corporate manslaughter in the commercial sector because it would all become very expensive and that UK plc would become less competitive and do less well. That argument would not find great favour here, nor does the Government’s argument about over-caution.