Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I should like to ask my noble and learned friend about the position in Scotland. One difficulty that might be foreseen there is that the offence of culpable homicide has a different basis from that of manslaughter in England and Wales. It is based on gross negligence in England and Wales, whereas, in Scotland, culpable homicide is based on recklessness. Might that raise particular difficulties if we admitted the possibility of secondary liability? It is difficult to be art and part, guilty of an offence of corporate manslaughter, when the law in Scotland on individual liability is based on recklessness. A company in Scotland could be charged with corporate homicide but the individual directors might be charged with culpable homicide under the existing common law. In those circumstances, does my noble and learned friend think that there would be a difficulty in providing separately for secondary liability on the basis of the amendments? I refer in particular to those in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Razzall and Lord Lee, which would exclude Clause 16 altogether or, in the case of Amendments Nos. 90 and 91, change the wording in subsection (2) from ““an individual cannot”” to ““an individual can””.