I am certainly in no position to gainsay those statistics. I will adhere to the undertaking to get the information that has been requested.
Other amendments propose to address this issue through secondary liability, but there are distinct problems. For example, there is a proposal to introduce a new basis on which a person could be guilty of manslaughter through gross negligence. We are not persuaded that this is appropriate. If a person has been grossly negligent and, as a result, has been responsible for someone’s death, they should be prosecuted for the existing offence, not on a secondary basis for the corporate offence. Perhaps more importantly, we do not think that providing secondary liability for the new offence would cover a level of criminal behaviour that is distinct from the culpability required for a conviction for manslaughter.
To show that an individual aided, abetted, counselled or procured an offence, it would generally be necessary to show that the accessory had a similar state of mind as the main offender, or at least knew or intended that the offence would be committed. In the context of corporate manslaughter, this would mean that an individual would need to be aware of the picture of failing in the organisation, at least contemplate it being grossly negligent, and act in a way that supported or sought to bring that about. But in those circumstances, it is likely that an individual charge of manslaughter would be possible.
We do not think that by allowing secondary liability for the new offence we would achieve any significant extension of individual liability, but would create a new level of complexity. As well as assessing individual liability in terms of existing criminal offences, such as manslaughter and under health and safety law, the police and prosecution would need to explore any potential differences under the provisions relating to secondary liability. We are not persuaded that that would be a useful exercise.
Finally, as regards Amendment No. 92 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, the first two subsections touch on the central issue of secondary liability, which I have already sought to address. I will therefore confine my remarks to subsections (3) and (4) of the proposed replacement for Clause 16.
We are not satisfied that the reference to the law of conspiracy is appropriate. Under the Criminal Law Act 1977, a conspiracy involves a number of people agreeing that a course of conduct will be pursued that will involve one of them committing an offence. It is difficult to envisage the application of this test to the new offence because this offence will, uniquely, be capable of being committed only by an organisation. For the test for a conspiracy to be satisfied, it would therefore be necessary for the legal entity, such as the corporate body itself, to be a party to the agreement, which we doubt is a practical proposition.
As to linking an offence under the Bill with any civil liability for damages, we are alive to the concern that it should not be necessary for the circumstances of an offence to be reconsidered at length in civil proceedings if a conviction has already been gained in a criminal trial. The law would, however, appear to cater for this already. Section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 provides a rebuttable presumption that a person convicted of an offence committed that offence. Conviction will therefore provide evidence in civil proceedings of a gross breach of a duty of care in the law of negligence.
I therefore hope—perhaps fondly—that noble Lords are to some extent persuaded that the focus we have placed in the Bill on corporate liability is the right one and that, on the basis of these remarks, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
On a personal note, I observe that on one occasion, for a brief period, I was an employee of senior management, two of whom are present in this Room; I refer to my noble friends Lady Turner and Lord Hoyle. On that occasion, I never felt that senior management was doing anything other than looking after my best interests.
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Monday, 15 January 2007.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee proceeding on Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
Reference
688 c214-5GC Session
2006-07Chamber / Committee
House of Lords Grand CommitteeSubjects
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