Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

Why Clause 16 is in the Bill is for others to explain. I am saying that it cannot remain there if my amendment is accepted. That is why I am speaking in the same debate on whether Clause 16 shall stand part of the Bill. Mine is a minimal amendment. I have no wish to introduce what has been called a ““party-political approach””, but the Government’s election manifesto pledged to introduce what they have put forward as corporate manslaughter; namely, that if all the conditions imposed by Clauses 1 and 2 are met, the primary liability in criminal responsibility should rest with the corporation or a company in the average case. The Government naturally did not put in their manifesto—no one in their right mind would think of doing so—““Ah, around the rules that normally apply to every citizen about aiding and abetting, we give you no promise whatever””. It would be quite absurd to do so, yet the proposed provisions would apply to what would normally be managers or directors—let us call a spade a spade: it would apply to directors, although they need not be directors. This is where the amendment differs from Amendment No. 35, which names directors and so on. I am not concerned with who has abetted the crime; I am concerned with the normal rule of law applying to them. The Bill does not create primary liability in an individual. Noble Lords will see that proposed subsection (1) of Amendment No. 92 reaffirms that principle, whatever the arguments may be about extending the ambit of what the Bill sets out to do. They will see also that proposed subsection (2) is contrary to Clause 16 because it applies the normal rules of law to acts of aiding and abetting. It is perfectly possible that such a secondary liability would arise. Some noble Lords will think that it will be very rare; others will think that it will be pretty rare. I do not think that it will be the normal case. However, when the legislature passes such a Bill as this, it must bear in mind that such a liability could arise. I am sure that noble Lords are eager and avid readers of the Sunday Times and the Financial Times. Today, they will have noticed that next week, or possibly even earlier, a report on the liabilities and failures of one of our great corporations, BP, is to appear in the United States. A committee headed by Mr Baker has gone through its record and has looked at the dreadful explosion in its operation in Texas and at the corrosion and leaks in the Alaska oil pipeline. Today’s Financial Times states that those who have seen a draft of the report say that no one escapes blame, including everyone on the board. If that is so, it is quite extraordinary, but BP is a huge organisation and there were huge explosions in Texas, with huge damage to people and the environment in Alaska. I do not say that that could happen here but, if those who have seen the report are right and if such things happened here, under the Bill a case of aiding and abetting a crime would be arguable and should not be dismissed lightly. It does not matter what noble Lords think of that. It is merely current affairs on the matter that have sparked a lot of interest. I do not have to prove that anyone would aid, abet, counsel or procure this offence; I say only that that is the ordinary rule of law. I know of no exception in regard to a major offence. It is far wider than any trade union immunity that ever existed. The immunity from civil liability granted for trade unions in 1906 and destroyed by the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, in his 1982 legislation was minuscule compared with this vast immunity for those who aid or abet this crime. I shall mention two details about Amendment No. 92. Noble Lords who have looked at it will have seen that subsection (3) maintains the law relating to conspiracy. I say nothing about that. Those whom I have discussed it with have never raised objections. If there is no valid objection, that could go out, but it seems worth saying expressly. The same applies to subsection (4), which relates to civil law. There is a saying that has been accepted by noble and learned Law Lords in many cases. Paragraph 24/88 of the 18th edition of Clerk and Linsell on Torts states: "““There exists a tort of uncertain ambit which consists in one person using unlawful means with the object and effect of causing damage to another””." In litigation, the question of whether a particular breach of statute is an unlawful means within that general principle is often problematical. It is always worth saying so in legislation so as not to waste the time and money of litigants, judges and the courts. I suggest to the Government that they should immediately accept this amendment because subsection (1) accepts that their manifesto promise was no more or less than that a corporation or organisation would suffer primary liability for corporate manslaughter. Proposed subsection (2) maintains the normal rule of law and does not accept the immunity that the Government have put in the Bill. The rest are details. As a footnote, I shall make a comment which is not in my notes. Having ditched the people in custody in the previous group of amendments, surely the Government will not ditch those who suffer from aiding and abetting as well as a primary liability in this group. The Home Office does not deserve that; it is in bad enough trouble as it is. For goodness’ sake, they are in a hole, so will the Government please stop digging?