Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I am also a partner in Beachcroft LLP and am as committed as the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, is to preventing this Bill from being a lawyers’ paradise. Amendment No. 24 would widen the application of the duty of care to apply to members of the public. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, referred to this earlier in our deliberations today. Amendment No. 25 would insert the words ““or provision”” so that the duties of care owed under the law of negligence would apply when an organisation is supplying or providing the services. The two amendments are tied; Amendment No. 24 would ensure a direct application of the duty of care to members of the public, while Amendment No. 25 would ensure that where public authorities have contact with members of the public—for example, but not exclusively, in providing public services—they would have a duty of care towards the public. As I understand it, Ministers and the Home Office have so far deliberately omitted the word ““provision”” from the Bill. The Minister in another place said, "““the term ‘providing’ covers a potentially wider range of activity and could include many situations in which no duty of care is owed. For example, it would extend to circumstances in which a service was provided to the public at large, such as when local authorities were working to cut crime. No duty of care is owed in that respect, nor is the activity being supplied.—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 24/10/06; col. 96.]" That sounds a reasonable argument, but my point is much more general. I see no reason why the duty should not apply to the public at large. It is surprising that the Government would argue that public authorities have anything other than a full duty of care towards the public. I know that many outside this place feel that this is just another example of how the Home Office has sought to include in the Bill numerous levels of exemption from liability for public bodies. The arguments of outside organisations, such as Liberty, are persuasive. I do not believe that it is necessary or acceptable to include such wide-ranging exemptions for the activities of government and the various agencies of government. I am particularly concerned about the way in which Clause 2 acts—my noble and learned friend, Lord Lyell, has been probing this—indirectly as a wide-ranging exemption from liability. If it is decided that exemptions are appropriate, these should be clearly stated in the Bill, just as they are in Clauses 4 to 7, on which we shall be deliberating later. They should not be hidden away in obscure and legalistic questions of whether the words ““provision”” and ““supply”” appear in a definition of ““relevant duty of care””. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, in that respect. I hope that the Minister will give us a fuller explanation of why we have differing levels of exemption. If we want a simple and even-handed law, this is moving in the wrong direction, unless the noble Lord can persuade us otherwise. I beg to move.