Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I am grateful, as ever, to the noble, Lord Wedderburn, for explaining his amendment, the intention behind it being to widen the definition of the law of negligence to duties arising from a contract office or fiduciary obligation. Like the noble Lord, Lord Henley—to whom I apologise for failing to accurately bracket him with the lawyers in the Committee—I remain to be convinced by his argument. It would not be an appropriate extension of the offence because, with the new offence, we are uniquely concerned with the liability of the organisation itself, not of individual employees or officers. The offence is based on the personal duty of care that the corporate body owed the victim. It does not arise as a matter of vicarious liability. The duty of care owed by an employer to his employee to ensure a safe system of work, for example, is a personal one. Where the employer is a corporate body, the duty is owed by the organisation. With the focus therefore on duties of care owed by the corporate body, it would not be wise or sensible to extend the offence to duties primarily owed by individuals such as office holders or to fiduciary obligations such as those owed by trustees or directors which, again, are generally not applicable to corporate bodies. On the other hand, it is clear than corporate bodies can and do owe contractual duties. In such circumstances, a common-law duty of care will be owed for the performance of activities under the contract. The implication of the amendment, however, would be that the offence would apply where a contractual duty has been breached regardless of any common-law duty. We are wary of making that move. For example, if a hospital is contracted to provide a particular treatment to a person, it falls under a common-law duty of care to provide that treatment to the proper standard and to care adequately for the patient. If it grossly fails in that duty, with fatal consequences, it can be liable under the offence subject to the tests properly set out in the Bill. However, it is also under a contractual duty to provide the treatment in the first place. The amendment would mean potentially applying the offence as a remedy for not performing the contract at all. The Committee will accept that that would represent a significant extension of the law of negligence and criminal liability. We are not attracted to the amendment and I hope that, having heard my explanation and expression of concern about the real effect of his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, will feel able to withdraw it.