Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I have been somewhat entertained by the lawyers on this, but I think the majority of them have got it right. The noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd, learned Lord Boyd and Lord Lyell, and the noble Lord, Lord Henley, are all in the right ballpark. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, said, the offence is in line with the current offence of corporate manslaughter, which is about gross failings causing death. For an offence as serious as homicide, the threshold for the offence should be high: a gross breach of a duty of care. A ““gross breach”” is defined in terms of conduct that falls far below what reasonably could have been expected of the organisation in the circumstances. ““Far below”” is a way of describing ““gross””, and is not an additional factor. The duty does not import a requirement of grossness; that is only achieved through the use of ““far””, the definition of what is gross. Going back to the practicality that the noble Lord, Lord James, was wishing upon us, it is a test allowing, perhaps not boardrooms but, more importantly in this instance, juries to compare the actual behaviour with what could reasonably be expected. It ensures that the breach is not a simple case of negligence but is truly exceptionally bad. If we were to remove the requirement that the conduct fell far below what could have been expected, then an offence could be made out on the basis of negligence alone. That would mean that the threshold for the new offence would be the same as that for health and safety breaches. That is not our intention, nor that of the Law Commission. The intention with this offence is to mark out and label companies that have shown utter disregard for the health and safety of those affected by their activities and, as a result, caused a death. We do not want companies to be guilty of homicide on the basis of minor breaches of health and safety legislation or when genuine efforts have been made, but the appropriate standards have not quite been met. That would devalue the significance of the offence, and impact upon boardrooms taking these issues seriously and ensuring that that is reflected down their organisation. For those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.