Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I hesitate to interrupt because there are lawyers on both sides. I am sure that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Lloyd and Lord Lyell, do not require any assistance from me on this matter, but, in my submission, it is absolutely clear that under Clause 1(1)(b) an organisation becomes guilty if, through the management or organisation, it causes a person’s death and that amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased. You then go to Clause 1(4)(b) to find out the definition of what amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care. It is a fairly standard matter of legal interpretation. A breach of the duty of care becomes gross because it falls far below the standard that can reasonably be expected. The word ““far”” is vital to the concept of this offence. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, is absolutely right. If you take out the word ““far””, the action of negligence is then elevated to criminal liability. It seems to me that this amendment drives a coach and horses right through the whole concept of the Bill.