Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Bill

I appreciate that intervention and the hon. Gentleman is right. Unless my eyesight has deteriorated to an extent that I do not recognise, the Bill contains no provision that obliges the DPP to detail on the certificate the particular cause. We should bear in mind in all our consideration the fundamental tenet of British justice that every defendant is innocent until proven guilty. I am deeply concerned, therefore, that the explanatory notes accompanying the Bill, and the Secretary of State, in his introductory remarks—I am sorry that he is no longer in his place, but I am sure that he will return for the winding-up speeches—were careful to curtail the extent of the judgment in the Shuker case. The decision in that case, heard in Northern Ireland before the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Justice Campbell in 2004, is quoted in support of clause 7. I am disappointed that the explanatory notes and the Secretary of State did not go further and convey the full import of what was said in that judgment. It is correct that the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Justice Campbell said, in relation to non-jury trials and, specifically, to decisions by the Attorney-General:"““We have concluded that it is not a process which is suitable for the full panoply of judicial review superintendence””." That conclusion was cited in the explanatory notes and by the Secretary of State today. However, the actual judgment, in paragraph 27, states:"““It must be made clear that while we have concluded that judicial review is not available to challenge a decision of the Attorney in the present cases, we do not consider that this will be excluded in every circumstance.””" That includes, for example,"““the ground of bad faith.””" Critically, the court also held:"““Depending on the circumstances of other cases that may arise, further grounds of judicial review challenge may be deemed appropriate but we do not consider that it would be helpful, or even possible, to predict what those grounds might be.””" The Shuker judgment made it clear that a decision by the Attorney-General, as it was then, or the DPP as now, could be challenged. The judgment does not limit that challenge to grounds of dishonesty and bad faith.