Terrorism (Detention and Human Rights)

I see the Minister shaking his head, but that probably was an accidental and not very brilliant example. My next example puts in a nutshell some of the difficulties that we face as Members of Parliament in representing our constituents. Into my surgery came Mouloud Sihali. He was tried and acquitted in relation to the Wood Green ricin plot, but it is clear that the authorities still suspect him. As I have mentioned, the ricin plot was used as justification for extending the period for which people can be detained without trial. It is true that one person skipped to Algeria, but he was actually released after only two days, so even under the law as it stood the police could have kept him in detention for much longer if they had wanted to and he could have been charged with acts preparatory to terrorism. I keep returning to this point: if he was a major terrorist whose existence would justify detention without trial for 90 days, why did the police let him go after two? Mr. Sihali came to see me because he is under a virtual control order, without being under a control order per se. Despite being cleared and acquitted of the ricin plot and freed—he was allowed to go completely free—for five months, he is now tagged, under curfew, not allowed to have a mobile phone, to use the internet or to have visitors to his room, and he has to report each day to the police. My concern is that he was completely free for five months. If the authorities are convinced he is a terrorist, why was he allowed to wander round completely free for five months? Did they change their mind back and forth as to whether he was a terrorist, and if they have changed their mind, how good was the basic evidence? Mr. Sihali is facing deportation as a threat to national security, but the evidence will be judged in secret and will never be seen by either a normal court or Mr. Sihali. He has been convicted of a passport offence and was in this country illegally, so I do not have a problem—nor does he—with deportation on those grounds. However, he is facing deportation on the grounds of being a threat to national security and if he is deported on those grounds, for the rest of his days he will have the stigma of having been thought to be a terrorist. That is an awful burden to carry, unless he really is a terrorist. The point is he will not have the chance to argue his innocence and he argues that he should be given a chance to clear his name. I had sitting in front of me in my surgery the whole problem in a nutshell. It was about the issue and legality of some of the powers under the Terrorism Act 2000—about control orders and secret evidence, the terrorist threat and civil liberties. If we get it wrong either way we face huge consequences—either letting a terrorist go free or tarring an innocent man for life. He is one of my constituents, but would I be fighting to help an innocent man or aiding a terrorist? I have no idea without knowing what the secret evidence is. The only route that I can follow is to get a meeting with the Home Secretary, which I am trying desperately to do. For me, that sums up how the legislation comes down to the coal face of reality when we try to deal with such issues. I would prefer it if the reports made some suggestion that might allow a charge to be made on other grounds, by using the lower threshold, post-charge questioning or intercept evidence—anything that would enable steps to be taken towards bringing a charge or prosecution—rather than this no-man’s land where I, Mr. Sihali and a great number of people have no idea where the truth lies. As the report by the Home Affairs Committee indicated, the nature of the terrorist threat might well have changed beyond all recognition compared to the threat posed by terrorism connected with Irish republicanism. However, although the nature of terrorism might be changing it is absolutely essential that the rules and framework of international law within which it must be tackled do not change. The close scrutiny by the Joint Committee on Human Rights of the Government’s counter-terrorism legislation has sent a clear message: national laws might change in the wake of an attack to the extent required by human rights law, but the applicable human rights rules should not. I found it interesting that the Joint Committee on Human Rights used France and Spain as examples where prosecutions are public and where open trials go on according to criminal procedures. By contrast, in the UK there appeared to be a fear among the police and security services that criminal prosecution using intercept evidence would inevitably lead to sensitive sources being revealed in open court, which leaves the need to resort to the use of administrative detention, control orders and memorandums of understanding with foreign countries instead of prosecution. The Joint Committee report also makes a number of suggestions that many hon. Members have spoken about today, so I will not hold up the Chamber by reiterating them all. Apart from those matters that I have already mentioned, on which the report is good, I note the stress that it places on the importance of turning intelligence into evidence. That is critical. We need to move more towards evidence rather than simply holding on to intelligence in the hope that, in time, further evidence will be accidentally produced. I hope the Government will make a note of that, particularly the section on intercept evidence. The irony is that the Government are willing to lock up suspects without charge, but not to use intercept evidence to prove their case and to convict. What is the purpose of incarceration without a conviction? The Liberal Democrats wish to see the bar on intercept evidence in criminal trials removed. The inadmissibility of intercept evidence must be a major factor in not being able to bring charges. We presume that much evidence must be gathered by way of intercept, and that it would not meet the relevant charging standards. Continuing inadmissibility means that charges cannot be brought so easily. Earlier this year, Lord Carlile reiterated his view that"““there might possibly be a few cases in which it would be appropriate and useful to deploy in a criminal prosecution material derived from public system telephone interceptions and convertible into criminal evidence"." The JCHR concluded that"““the ban on the use of intercept evidence in court should now be removed, and attention should be turned urgently to ways of relaxing the ban.””" As we heard from other Members, the Attorney-General too has come out recently on post-charge questioning and so on. I shall summarise. Our country faces a deadly threat. All sides in the House agree on that. We are fortunate that our police and intelligence services have been able to disrupt and prevent so many attempts to bring death and mayhem to our streets. Laws that prevent an act from taking place by restricting liberty or removing due judicial process must, as the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen said, be kept under constant scrutiny and examination, and be constantly improved, lest they cross the line of absolute necessity. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, for example, allows stops without reasonable grounds for suspicion. Applications under that provision are made for particular areas, and once they are made the police do not need to apply the normal grounds in order to stop and search. Since coming into force, that section has been applied over the whole of London all the time. Once a power is given, its use can be seen as convenient—it is there in perpetuity rather than being used only for the extreme circumstances for which Parliament granted it. I urge the Government to heed and take seriously the findings and conclusions of both of these excellent reports.