Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

I will, I hope, assist my hon. Friend towards the end of my contribution by rounding off my view on each of the new clauses and amendments by stating what we will try to do. The aim of the group of amendments is to redefine the circumstances in which individuals will be guilty of an offence in the first place, or will be liable to some sanction. In our view, new clause 1 would lower the threshold for convicting a person of an offence of homicide by a very substantial degree, as has been mentioned. Under the proposal an individual could be convicted of corporate manslaughter and sent to prison for a term of up to a life sentence on the grounds of a mere contribution to the corporate offence. The new offence is intended to be set at the high threshold of gross negligence to ensure that it is positioned as a very serious offence. It would be counter to that aim if convictions were available for very low-level offending. It would be odd generally to make it possible for another person to be convicted of the same offence at such a different and lower threshold. The measure would mean that a person could be guilty of manslaughter on the basis of not gross negligence—or even negligence—but any contribution made. It is hard to see how a senior manager could have failed to have contributed in some way to a serious failure in the way in which his organisation was being run. The proposal runs the risk of creating guilt by association. New clause 1 would also represent a significant extension of criminal law to allow for imprisonment in such wide circumstances. The House and the other place considered at some length during the passage of the recent Road Safety Act 2006 the proposition that the law should provide for imprisonment on the basis of negligence. We considered that such a measure would be right in those circumstances, but this proposal would go substantially beyond that. New clause 6 appears to anticipate that objection by providing for a threshold of gross breach and a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment. I recognise the genuine efforts of my hon. Friend the Member for Eccles to find ways of extending the law in ways that the Government might be prepared to accept, but a person can already be convicted of manslaughter for the gross breach of their duty of care, and, again, could be liable to a penalty of life imprisonment. I am not convinced that the way in which the new clause is drafted would assist in bringing any new prosecutions. New clause 4 is an attempt to tackle the problem in a different way by making provision for disqualification. This is an area in which the Government have considered the possibility of further proposals. The law already provides for a director to be disqualified when they are convicted as an individual for certain offences, including health and safety offences. It is true that there have been relatively few disqualifications linked to health and safety convictions. The Health and Safety Executive has recognised that more could be done to remind courts of their disqualification powers. As I have said, revised guidance was issued to the executive’s inspectors in May, stating:"““In all cases where an individual is prosecuted for an indictable offence, where the offence is in connection with the management of a company, the court should be reminded that it has the power to disqualify under section 2(1) of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.””"