For the reasons I gave before. Someone who had been involved in the way the hon. Gentleman describes would be liable for conviction for manslaughter, and that is what they should be prosecuted for.
The point about new clause 4, which I found interesting in some ways, is that it provides a mechanism for the direct disqualification of directors, but to disqualify them one has to show that the offence was committed with their ““consent or connivance””, which means that they will have to be in the dock during the trial. That is just a muddling feature, given that the same outcome can be achieved without all the paraphernalia and extra cost of holding disqualification proceedings thereafter; that was my simple point.
To come back to the key issue, if somebody commits a killing by gross negligence through their direct, personal involvement, they should be prosecuted for manslaughter under existing law, but they should not be dragged into prison because they are associated with a corporation convicted of corporate manslaughter, because there injustice lies.
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Dominic Grieve
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Monday, 4 December 2006.
It occurred during Debate on bills on Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
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454 c44 Session
2006-07Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamberSubjects
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