Armed Forces Bill

I join the Minister in paying tribute to the soldier from the Duke of Lancaster’s Regiment who has tragically lost his life in Iraq. I am sure that the Minister reflected the views of the entire House in sending our condolences to his family. No one can approach this subject without being moved by the terrible human tragedy involved in the cold execution of soldiers by their brothers-in-arms in the midst of one of the most epic battles in history. No one has done more than the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) in bringing the issue before the House, as he has done persistently and tenaciously for the past 13 years. I suspect that in the fullness of time this will come to be known as the Mackinlay amendment. As Colonel John Hughes-Wilson wrote in the journal of the Royal United Services Institute:"““There can be no one who is not moved by the chilling reality of soldiers, often young men who had volunteered to serve their King and country, being tied to a stake, blindfolded and shot by a firing squad, sometimes by comrades from their own regiment. It is an image that has entered the national consciousness and which tugs at the heart of any decent person.””" Having said that, it is our duty as parliamentarians to look as objectively and sensitively as we can at the facts and to assess whether the action proposed by the Government in granting blanket pardons is correct, as that inevitably will have the effect of exonerating those who may well be deserving, but will also include those who, by any judgment, are not so deserving. In particular, I submit that we need to exercise great care in applying today’s standards to the conditions and mores of a century ago. The facts are as stated by the Under-Secretary. As the Secretary of State’s predecessor, the current Home Secretary, pointed out to the House on 24 July 1998, between 4 August 1914 and 31 March 1920, approximately 20,000 personnel were convicted of military offences for which the death penalty could have been awarded. That does not include civilian capital offences such as murder. Of those 20,000, something over 3,000 were actually sentenced to death. Approximately 90 per cent. of them escaped execution and 306 were actually executed. Each and every one of those is a personal tragedy for the soldiers, their families and their descendants. However, it is just 1.5 per cent. of all those charged with a capital offence. Given that this measure is the brainchild of the Secretary of State, many hon. Members will be surprised that he has decided not to present the arguments for bringing it before the House, but has left it to his hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, a brand new Minister. Perhaps the Secretary of State would like to explain why he has chosen not to—[Interruption.] The House will note that the Secretary of State does not want to answer. What has struck me as being so curious in this case is the speed with which the Secretary of State, who freely acknowledged that he approached his new position with virtually no experience of Her Majesty’s armed forces, rushed to a judgment so soon after taking over. Given his lack of experience and the fact that he had to brief himself on the workings of the MOD at a time when we are conducting two major concurrent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, how could he find the time to assess an issue that deserves very careful consideration? The Secretary of State’s predecessor had undertaken just such a review in less hectic times. As he said in his statement to the House in 1998:"““The review has been a long and complicated process.””" He reported that he had reviewed every aspect of the cases, including the medical evidence and the legal basis for the trials—field general courts martial. In respect of the medical records, he said that there was no implicit or explicit reference to any nervous or other psychological disorders. The review had also confirmed that procedures for the courts martial were correct, given the law as it stood at the time. He concluded:"““However frustrating, the passage of time means that the grounds for a blanket legal pardon on the basis of unsafe conviction just do not exist. We have therefore considered the cases individually.””—[Official Report, 24 July 1998; Vol. 316, c. 1372.]" Many are questioning how the Secretary of State came so swiftly to such a contrary position to that of his predecessor, a noted historian who had considered the issue in great detail.