Armed Forces Bill

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for making that point. A treaty whose purpose is to criminalise certain behaviour achieves its effect through the domestic law. So, for example, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and torture are a crime under UK law because of our domestic legislation. By ratifying the Geneva Conventions, states expressly undertake to enact legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions. The position is much the same in relation to the torture convention. The convention does not require criminal liability to be imposed on a person unless they are a party to a crime. The reality is therefore that compliance with our domestic law will avoid any criminal responsibility. But I would add that, if the commanding officer suspects that any offence is being committed, he should take what steps he can to ensure that it is investigated. He could not be told by anyone not to do so. Depending on the circumstances, it would probably be sufficient for him to call in the police. This would apply to any other serviceman, too, and indeed to any civilian who had such concerns. Of course he himself would commit a criminal offence only if the nature of his involvement crossed the threshold of criminal liability. If there was evidence that it had, this would quite rightly be a matter for the normal prosecutions and trial processes. To conclude, we are satisfied that the processes for handling foreign aircraft already make sufficient provision for compliance with both domestic and international law. The amendment could not give any more powers than our authorities already have. Commanding officers are not exposed to an unfair risk of prosecution. Most important, a commanding officer should involve—