Police and Justice Bill

My Lords, I hesitate to intervene in this debate, partly because I have not done so before, but also because many of the arguments have been so eloquently advanced already. However, I feel compelled to do so because I am particularly concerned about the effect of the amendments in relation to forum. Those amendments impose an obligation on a judge not to order the extradition of the person unless it appears in the light of all the circumstances that it would be in the interest of justice that the person should be tried in the category 1 state, which is the state seeking the extradition. There is a similar amendment for category 2 states. No guidance is given anywhere in the amendments about how one judges the interests of justice. One can have a situation where virtually all the evidence is in the United Kingdom, but the devastating consequences of the crime are felt in another state. The growth of internet crime and the free movement of peoples and goods can all contribute to such an effect. Does one judge the interests of justice by where the evidence is located or by where the effect of the crime is felt? From my recent experience in prosecution, I have real difficulty with sub-paragraph (2). It is here sought that, in deciding the issue of forum, the judge is to take into account whether the competent United Kingdom authorities have decided to refrain from prosecuting the person whose surrender was sought for the conduct constituting the offence for which extradition is requested. I accept that there is no obligation on the competent United Kingdom authority to make such a decision, but there is clearly an expectation—and, I imagine, there would be an expectation by the court—that the competent prosecuting authority would advise the court whether it had decided to refrain from prosecuting. I submit that that imposes a huge burden on the prosecuting authorities and has the effect of lengthening—perhaps considerably—extradition proceedings. In my judgment, no competent prosecuting authority would be prepared to give such an undertaking or make such a statement unless it had itself examined all the evidence. In Scotland, that would include precognition by the Crown authorities. We have been talking at length about white-collar crime, in which in some offences—whether it be fraud or money laundering—considerable documentation will be involved, much of it held by the requesting state. I fear that it could be a considerable time before the prosecuting authority could advise the court whether it was going to refrain from prosecuting. In Scotland, at least, the decision to prosecute is taken on two bases. The first is whether there is sufficient evidence to mount a prosecution. What is ““sufficient”” is judged according to the law in Scotland, which might be very different in the requesting state. For example, in Scotland, we require corroboration of all the essential elements of the offence. We also have strict rules about the use of hearsay—certainly stricter than the rules that now apply in England and Wales. A case may very well meet the evidential test in Scotland, but barely do so because of those tests. There may not be the same difficulty in countries seeking extradition. The second arm is the public interest. In Scotland, we require the prosecutor to decide that it is in the public interest to prosecute. It may be a moot point whether the public interest is to be appropriated by the interests of justice—perhaps for this purpose they are one and the same. One consideration that has historically been given weight, where there are elements of an offence in another country, is whether it would be appropriate for that offence to be prosecuted in another country. Prosecutors in Scotland have always had regard to that. Let us suppose that the Crown goes through the process of examining all the evidence and determining whether there is sufficiency. The Crown may come to the view that there is sufficient evidence to prosecute in Scotland, but it may very well also come to the view that it would be more appropriate for that offence to be prosecuted in the state seeking extradition. Note the important point: it is not that a prosecution is not in the public interest but that the interests of justice are better served by a prosecution in the extraditing state. Having gone through that process, the Crown in Scotland would presumably then be required to advise the court that it had decided to refrain from prosecuting. I ask the House to consider what happens if the request for extradition is refused. The person who is being sought will remain in this country. Presumably the question then arises whether that individual is to be prosecuted in the United Kingdom—certainly in Scotland. It may be that extradition was refused not because of the appropriateness of the forum but for some completely different reason. Noble Lords should remember that the Crown may well have taken the view that it would be in the public interest to prosecute but that prosecution should be in another country. What happens then? Does the case go back to the very authority that has already advised the court that it would refrain from prosecuting? Another difficulty in Scotland—I hesitate to mention it, but it is a real one—is that the Lord Advocate is barred from prosecuting once he has made it publicly known that he will not prosecute, even if he took the view that a prosecution was in the interests of justice. I submit that the amendments on forum would put in place a mechanism that is supposed to determine what is in the interests of justice but would, in fact, defeat the interests of justice. Finally, I find the proposition that we should renegotiate the treaty really rather alarming. I have been involved in extradition both from and to the United States and, as a recent prosecutor, I would be very alarmed if we were to return to the system that pre-existed the Extradition Act. For all those reasons, I support the Motion.