Police and Justice Bill

I shall return to that question as well, if I may, as it goes to the heart of many of our proposals in lieu of what the House of Lords has come up with. The Bill simply ensures that these existing intervention powers are fit for purpose. The changes that will be made by the Bill draw on our experience over the past four years in supporting forces to embed a performance culture, and on our work helping underperforming forces to turn around their performance. The Bill widens the sources of information that the Home Secretary can consider in deciding whether to exercise his powers. At present, intervention can only be triggered by an adverse report from HMIC, but there might well be other relevant sources of information such as the findings of a public inquiry—the most germane recent case in that respect being the Bichard inquiry. Secondly, the Bill streamlines the intervention process. In all but the most exceptional cases, statutory intervention will be considered at the point when all other means of collaboration and support have been attempted, but performance has failed to improve. In such circumstances, it may be that it is taking too long to show an acceptable level of performance improvement; that the force in question simply does not have the capability itself to address its problems; or, in the most extreme and unusual cases, that it refuses to co-operate to remedy its failings. In these circumstances, it is only right that we be able to act decisively and swiftly to address problems that are failing the communities whom the force and the police authority serve. It is interesting to note that the debate on intervention powers has moved on from that of five years ago. There seems to be more of an acceptance that the Home Secretary should have the powers to take action where the circumstances necessitate, and we have debated instead the right safeguards and the most appropriate path for their use. We recognise the strong feelings expressed about the changes, which would allow the Secretary of State—on some occasions—to direct a chief constable on performance matters, and not require him to route such direction through the police authority first. That is an entirely fair point. The provisions were by no means developed to shift the balance of power, and it has always been our intention that the usual route for intervention be directed through the police authority. The ability to direct the chief officer had been developed in the light of experience, which shows that there could be occasions when a police authority might not feel able—or, indeed, be able—to take the necessary steps. It was in such circumstances that we proposed direct intervention with the force, to enable us to get to the heart of the problem quickly and to take the necessary remedial action. We listened to the concerns raised in debates about this issue, and our amendments restore the position under the Police Reform Act 2002, which routes the intervention power through the police authority on all occasions. The amendments recognise that the police authority is primarily charged with holding the chief constable of a force to account. The second main concern has focused on what we feel is a misrepresentation of the intention behind these powers—namely, that the Secretary of State could use them on a whim or for trivial purposes, which he clearly would not. We have made it clear throughout that they are intended to be used only where serious and persistent performance concerns have arisen and other attempts to address them have failed. However, to provide further reassurance we are introducing an amendment that requires the Secretary of State to consult the inspectorate of constabulary when he proposes to use these powers and imposes a duty to publish the inspectorate’s opinion on the evidence leading to the proposed course of action. The intention is to ensure that the inspectorate’s professional and independent advice is available to the Secretary of State on whether the use of the powers is, in its opinion, the right course of action. That should provide confidence that the inspectorate’s opinion will remain in view when deciding whether to invoke the powers. The Government agreed on Report in the other place that it is right that this safeguard also be extended to include police authorities, and our amendments make such provision accordingly. So our amendments are intended to provide the Government with effective but proportionate intervention powers. We have listened to the concerns expressed about how those powers might be interpreted or used, and we have responded accordingly with some specific safeguards. These amendments need to be seen in the context of a series of Government amendments tabled in the other place that rightly reflected the concerns expressed there, and by the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities and others over the summer. We have sought to listen and to get this right, so it is almost with regret that I ask the House to reject amendment No. 1. It is important that the Home Secretary retain this reserve power, regardless of what party and Government he represents. I believe that we have moved sufficiently to deal with the concerns expressed about the extent of the Home Secretary’s intervention powers. Routing the process through the inspectorate and taking full account of the police authority, in the way outlined in our amendments, is the way forward and addresses those concerns. I therefore ask the House to accept our amendments and to reject the Lords amendments. I cannot deal fully now with the question that the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) asked earlier. Regarding the powers that have been in place since 2002, the answer to his question is none. As yet, intervention of that sort has not been required. But that is not to say that the police standards unit, as was—the Home Office changes its name all the time; I cannot remember what it is called now—has not engaged with constabularies in need of assistance in a largely informal, supportive and professional way to try to turn them round. The baseline assessments published by HMIC and the Home Office today show that such engagement does work. In the past couple of years, some eight forces have been engaged in such a fashion. As of today, the figure is only three, and their baseline assessments show a significant improvement compared with last year and that everything is moving in the right direction. I do not have to hand the figures on the use of the powers since 1994, about which the hon. Member for Broxbourne also asked. If I do not get some inspiration by the time the debate finishes, I shall write to him. I therefore ask the House as humbly as I can to reject amendments Nos. 1 and 71, and to accept the words in lieu.