UK Parliament / Open data

Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and the report touched on the issue. It is interesting to note that, while training is included, operational activities are not. That applies particularly to the emergency services. When I was in practice, I used to act on behalf of the Fire Brigades Union. A number of deaths were caused by serious management failures on the part of the fire service. As currently configured, the Bill would not include such management failure either. I am concerned about the breadth of the general exclusion for public functions in relation to statutory inspections. Such inspections constitute a public safeguard against death and injury. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? That requires clarification in the Bill. As I have said, I am pleased that the Government have provided some clarification in regard to emergency services, but it does not go far enough. In relation to management failure, I believe that the Government have created a significant loophole by tying the offence to the actions of senior managers. While the comments of Mr. Justice Sheen in the Zeebrugge ferry disaster inquiry castigated the management throughout—which might just have meant a successful prosecution under the Bill—I am not sure whether the test would have worked at King’s Cross, for example, where the failures were further down the food chain, but institutional in the organisation of London Underground. I believe that, in having to focus on the behaviour of senior managers, prosecutors will face disadvantages similar to those that they face under existing law, looking for individuals’ failures—albeit possibly aggregated—rather than corporate responsibility as a whole. The test would exclude prosecutions in cases in which death occurred in a discrete part of a business, geographically or sectorally. What of a large building site, one of many owned by a large developer, run by a major construction contractor? The person in charge of the site has a large say in how it is run, but may be a very small fish in a large multinational operation’s pond which sets the parameters within which he works, especially through finance and the deadlines required by the contract. The Government have indicated that the test will be reconsidered, but I believe that under the Bill as currently drafted, inadequate management practices and systems will escape—especially in large companies—exactly as they do under the existing laws. The proposed remedial order power is very welcome, but I believe that it would be better backed up by a contempt of court power, like any other order of the courts. That would overcome the argument over whether the sanction for not complying with a remedial order was correct. But I think that we need to consider more imaginative penalties, too. As has been said, the sanction available is the same as exists under health and safety law. It is difficult to imagine that fines—currently multimillion-pound fines, in some cases—will be much higher, so it must be asked whether the Bill adds value to the existing position. I believe that the Government are right to say that they will consider more innovative sanctions in the light of the wider review of penalties for regulatory offences. The Government have suggested that existing legislation allows the disqualification of directors if they have been convicted on indictment, but that response overlooks the fact that they cannot be so convicted, as there is no individual liability under the Bill. The opportunity must be taken to introduce a wider, more innovative range of penalties that are likely to provide a better deterrent to poor health and safety practices, and to deliver justice more effectively to bereaved families.

About this proceeding contribution

Reference

450 c219-20 

Session

2005-06

Chamber / Committee

House of Commons chamber
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