Police and Justice Bill

moved Amendment No. 38: Page 88, line 31, leave out paragraphs 26 to 28. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving the amendment, I first welcome the amendments moved by the Minister. They go some way towards limiting the powers of the Secretary of State to intervene in police forces, so that the inspectorate will be involved in deciding whether a force is failing. Unfortunately, they do not deal with the underlying problem with this part. I shall explain that. It is the power of the Secretary of State to give directions to chief officers of police. That is completely unconstitutional and represents a radical unbalancing of the tripartite relationship. It is also potentially a very dangerous weapon in the wrong hands. In fairness, the Minister's amendments suggest that in most circumstances the Secretary of State's directions should be made through the police authority, but there is a sting in the tail of the amendments, which renders them almost meaningless. The Secretary of State may direct the chief officer where he deems that the authority is failing. There is no independent judgment built into the process. It is the Secretary of State who decides what ““failing”” means. It is widely drawn, covering any functions of an authority whether generally or in a particular respect. In theory, that means that if, say, a police force was not very good at clearing dead dogs off a motorway or a police authority was not very good at keeping hard-copy archived records—which, I understand, have to be bound on green paper of a particular quality—going back for ever, the Secretary of State could give directions to the chief officer. I do not suggest that the current Secretary of State would use such a power injudiciously or unfairly; I merely observe that it would be easy for a Secretary of State whose motives may be more questionable to misuse such a wide power at some point in the future. In addition, the government amendments do nothing to ameliorate the concerns expressed in Committee about the Secretary of State being blessed with foreknowledge about when a force or authority will fail. Again, this could be open to misuse. I accept that a role envisaged for the inspectorate with regard to forces should provide some comfort in this respect, but there is silence about any equivalent role with regard to authorities. This is the key issue in the direction of chief officers. Amendment No. 38, which would leave out paragraphs 26 to 28 on ““Power to give directions to police authority or chief officer””, would dispense altogether with what could be a dangerous part of the Bill. That would be my preference. However, I am a realist and I recognise that it is always sensible to have a plan B. The other amendments would provide an alternative that would prevent the Secretary of State giving directions to chief officers but would allow him some intervention powers through the authority. Crucially, however, it would place sensible limitations on what ““failing”” means. This is an important matter that goes to the heart of the balance between central and local powers and between chief officers, police authorities and the Secretary of State—the tripartite balance. The other centralising measures in the Bill are a grave cause for concern, but these proposals must be where the line is drawn. I also ask the Minister to say how the Government think they will find the capacity and the expertise to intervene in police authorities. To date, the Home Office’s policing support unit has used a few civil servants in its intervention work with forces, but it has relied mostly on seconded police officers. Given that most police authorities run an extremely tight ship, it is unlikely that they will be able to find some spare people to undertake these duties. Finally, I return to the nub of my concerns: if the Secretary of State can tell chief officers what to do, all the other arguments about exactly how the balance will be shared between the tripartite partners are simply whistling in the wind. I beg to move.