Animal Welfare Bill

I shall begin by continuing on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee reported on the Bill in its report that was published on 27 April. Today, it noted the letter dated 15 May in which the Minister provided further information to explain the importance of the delegated powers under Clauses 12 and 13. The noble Baronesses raised the Delegated Powers Committee in passing, but the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, raised it in more detail. It is appropriate to bring the concerns of the Committee to the attention of Members of this Grand Committee. The Minister’s letter will be published in the Delegated Powers Committee’s report and will be available in the Printed Paper Office tomorrow. It gives greater explanation about the need for search powers, without which many of the improvements in the Bill compared with the 1911 Act would be lost. Clearly, the noble Baronesses and the noble Lord will not be able to consider all the information now, but we look to forward to discussions, if needed, on Report. There could be a meeting of the two Front Benches between Committee and Report, if they would find that helpful. It is important to place that on the record. We do not expect the noble Baronesses to respond to that in the particular circumstances and timing. One of the most important features of the Bill is that it is flexible enough to respond to future circumstances. It will allow us to keep our animal welfare laws and enforcement practices up to date more easily than the previous legislation did. It will extend the flexibility that has served farm animal welfare so well for the past 40 years to non-farmed animal welfare. I shall speak first to Amendment No. 59. Noble Lords will be aware that the published draft contained an extensive list of situations in which it would have been possible to exercise this power. On the advice of the EFRA Committee and in the interests of simplicity, we have removed many of these from the final Bill, as they are clearly included in the power in Clause 12(1) without the need to specify them individually. Further, retaining the detailed list risked jeopardising the generality of the power, and to return to such a detailed list would be a backward step. We do not consider that it would be desirable to have a list of instances in which the power can be used and to remove the ability to use the power in any other circumstances. Even with the comprehensive list of examples that we included in the published draft there would almost certainly have been gaps. We would not want to be put in a position where a serious welfare problem is brought to our attention but we are unable to act in the most appropriate manner because of the circumscription of the power. Our objections to Amendment No. 64 illustrate this point well. The amendment would ensure that the Government have the power to regulate the use of electronic training aids on dogs. We have no plans at present to regulate in this area. I think it is important that the appropriate national authority has the power to do so and I can confirm that Clause 12 already contains such a power. However, if we were drafting this Bill just 20 years ago, few people would have thought it necessary to include a power to cover electronic training aids, as they were barely used in this country. Equally, we do not know what potential welfare concerns will exist in 10, or even two, years from now. That is why it is right that we have a flexible power to act rather than a rigid, constrained power that is frozen in the concerns of the present without the adaptability to respond to developments in future. Turning to Amendments Nos. 65 and 66, we have not removed all of the listed examples, as there are some important powers that might not otherwise be covered by the wording in Clause 12(1). These are therefore still listed as examples of how that power could be used. One of them is the power that Amendment No. 65 seeks to delete and that Amendments Nos. 66 and 67 seek to constrain. It is important that the Government retain the power to make provisions about the establishment of bodies to advise on animal welfare. It is right that advisory bodies can be, and often are, created administratively. However, we believe that a future Government may see real benefits in establishing a body on a statutory footing. The Government could then, with Parliament’s approval, make provisions about, for example, its remit and membership, but could distance itself from its day-to-day operation. This could therefore, where appropriate, allow for the establishment of a more independent advisory body, which is what Amendment No. 66 seeks to create. I do not think it would be sensible to restrict such bodies to advising only on scientific matters. While a large proportion of any such advice may well be of a scientific nature, we do not see any benefit in restricting the role of the bodies in such a way. I understand the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, and I know that her colleagues in the House of Commons expressed concern that people with no ties to organisations such as the RSPCA might be appointed to an advisory body. We consider those concerns misplaced. In the first place, the appropriate national authority could be held accountable for the people it appoints to such a body and for the functioning of that body. Secondly, to say that members of a group must be fully independent of Government, animal keeping, or any other animal interest would entirely defeat the purpose of having a body to offer advice. We suggest that very few people who have something useful to contribute would not have some connection to animal welfare interests. Furthermore, the required consultation, pre-legislative scrutiny and parliamentary debate as part of the affirmative procedure will ensure that any proposals to establish a body are fully debated in an open and transparent fashion. The proposal in Amendment No. 61 to restrict the power to only those measures aimed at improving compliance with the Act would severely limit this clause’s crucial flexibility. We have been clear all along that there are some activities that the provisions on the face of the Bill alone might not adequately regulate. The debate that has taken place on matters such as wild animal acts in travelling circuses and the use of electronic training aids, which we discussed yesterday, has shown the need to make legislation that genuinely promotes welfare by keeping abreast of changes in attitude, scientific developments and knowledge. That is not going to happen just from insisting on rigid compliance with what is already set out in the law. Further regulation in the form of licensing or registration might be necessary to ensure that appropriate animal welfare standards are met. In other cases, a different type of regulation might be necessary. Any regulation proposed under this clause would be subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament under the affirmative procedure. I noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, referred to Amendment No. 60 as a probing amendment. We are concerned that the term ““improving”” could require the identification of a specific problem that requires improvement before regulations can be made. It might also suggest that regulations can be made only if everyone subject to the regulations improves the standards that they currently apply. The word ““promote”” recognises that not everyone will need to improve their standards in order to comply with the regulations, but those regulations are needed for those who need to improve their standards. Amendments Nos. 62 and 63 are unnecessary. The Secretary of State and the National Assembly for Wales would always take such scientific evidence as there is into account when making regulations. Best practice in policy making already dictates that. In line with better regulation principles, we do not feel that it is desirable to legislate for something which, in practice, already happens and will continue to happen. Further, by emphasising the use of scientific evidence, we risk restricting the factors that the appropriate national authority could take into account when deciding whether to regulate. It may not, for example, allow the social or economic consequences of a regulation to be considered. On Amendment No. 68, following the same principles of better regulation, we do not consider it desirable to commit to laying before Parliament an analysis of the evidence. All new proposals for secondary regulations will be accompanied by regulatory impact assessments which will, where appropriate, contain an assessment of all the evidence that the Government considered. Finally, we are more than happy to consider Amendment No. 74. We acknowledge that the EFRA Committee of another place recommended that a duty to consult be introduced to the clause, allowing regulations to promote welfare which, at the time, included the power to introduce licensing and registration. We introduced that duty, but when the licensing and registration power was separated out, the duty to consult in this clause was not carried over. We will, of course, consult fully on all procedures anyway; Cabinet Office guidelines and general best practice in policy making require it. While consultation would happen anyway, we acknowledge that Parliament might prefer that there was a statutory obligation to consult. I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment and will bring forward an amendment to this effect on Report. I am sorry to have taken so long, but this is an important area and it is important to have that information on the record. I hope it will be helpful. I repeat that should it be helpful to hold a meeting between Committee and Report to cover the different areas that, from their body language, I noticed that neither noble Baroness was particularly happy about, the Minister would agree.