Animal Welfare Bill

There is another group—domestic individual members of a non-domesticated species. I shall try to deploy the argument around that and show that the amendments do not add anything to the Bill. I understand the concern expressed by the noble Baroness in proposing her amendment. For example, a giraffe that is born and raised in a zoo is treated as having the same needs as a giraffe on the plains of South Africa. Even though it might, individually, be considered to be a domesticated animal, it should still be treated as non-domesticated under the Bill because of the species that it belongs to. The species of an animal will be an inherent consideration in ascertaining its needs under Clause 9(2) for the purpose of determining whether those needs have been met. We cannot envisage a situation in which a court could consider an alleged welfare violation in respect of such animals without taking their species into account. It is impossible to ascertain what their needs are without having regard to the fact that they are of a species that is not commonly domesticated in the United Kingdom. To pursue our example, how could a court determine whether a giraffe’s needs had been met without having regard to the fact that it was a giraffe? So the species must be taken into account. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is trying to establish an element of additional protection for what we might call domestic individual members of a non-domesticated species. She wishes to ensure that their needs are not taken to be limited simply by virtue of the fact that they were born and raised in captivity. In veterinary terms, there might be some dispute about whether an animal that is captive born and bred has the same needs as a wild member of the same species, but I do not see how we can go down that road. Instead, I reassure the noble Baroness that the Bill does not make distinctions between captive and wild-born members of the same non-domesticated species. The distinction in Clause 2, based on species commonly domesticated in the British Islands, operates throughout the Bill. It is a distinction based on the species as a whole and not on the circumstances of an individual animal. So, if a court were considering whether an animal was domesticated, it would not simply look at whether the individual animal was born and raised in the British Islands but would ask whether it was of a species that is commonly domesticated in the British Islands. On that basis, I reassure the noble Baroness that the giraffe will not be considered a domesticated species simply because it is captive-born in a zoo. Its needs might well be the same as its wild counterparts. What will amount to reasonable steps under Clause 9(1) to meet those needs may be different, because I do not think that a court would consider it reasonable to expect the owner of a zoo premises to provide savannah-type surroundings for his giraffes by direct analogy with the wild-born members of that species. However, the issue of what the giraffe’s needs are is distinct from the issue of what steps are required to meet them. Certainly, the Bill acknowledges that its needs should be ascertained according to its species and according to its circumstances and not only to the extent that they are relevant to its needs. All pets and farmed livestock are covered by the Bill and there is no need for a further split in the definitions. I hope that that reassures the noble Countess.