Animal Welfare Bill

The answer to the last question is no, and I shall explain the reasons in a moment. I shall deal first with one or two of the points that have been put to me so as to give some clarity here. There is currently a legal requirement to report to the police a road accident involving a dog; there is no such requirement for other animals. That refers specifically to road accidents. I was asked whether a motorist who passes an injured cat on the road is required to stop and look after it, and the answer is no. That also applies to a badger, which, of course, has special protection anyway. Even if a motorist saw a badger in the last throes of TB and clearly distressed dragging itself across the road and not quite making it, there would be no requirement on him to stop and he would not commit an offence if he did not do so. As to the point about mental problems raised by the noble Countess, there will be a power to seize an animal if an offence has been committed, but it is unlikely that the person will be prosecuted, depending on their degree of mental incapacity. One does not wish to be unreasonable about this, but we could solve the problem, first, by taking the animal into care and, secondly, by not prosecuting the person depending on their degree of mental impairment. Zoo animals, including tigers, are covered under the Bill, both in relation to cruelty and welfare. Zoos, of course, are also licensed under the Zoo Licensing Act and are inspected by approved inspectors. This Act also includes provisions relating to welfare. I hope that that puts into context some of the points with which I will deal in my formal response to particular amendments. Amendments Nos. 7 and 8 seek to raise the threshold so that the offence is committed only where unnecessary, substantial suffering has occurred. I can understand the concern that it would be possible to prosecute someone under the Bill even if the animal’s suffering had been minimal. However, I suggest that the concept of suffering has a fairly high threshold, and if an animal has experienced unnecessary suffering, then frankly, regardless of the degree of suffering, why should a prosecution not be brought? That is the point. There is no such additional threshold in existing legislation. The concept of unnecessary suffering is not a new one. It was present, in particular, in the 1911 Act, under which a person is guilty of an offence if he causes any unnecessary suffering. I do not have details of any problems caused by enforcement that would justify the introduction of additional requirements here. Clause 4(3) sets out the considerations which it is relevant to have regard to when determining whether suffering was unnecessary. We think that it would be unwise to tie the court’s hands in deciding what is unnecessary. As I say, it is not defined in the 1911 Act, which is the current law. This has worked well and has not caused problems in case law. Obviously the court would adjust any sentence imposed on conviction to take account of the severity of the suffering caused. That is the point at which the matter would be taken into account. The sentencing guidelines available to magistrates make it clear that the harm caused and the harm intended are relative factors in assessing an offender’s culpability. So that aspect is taken into account in the guidelines. As to Amendments Nos. 9, 10 and 11 in relation to the considerations that the court may take into account in determining whether suffering is unnecessary, I have referred to Clause 4(3) as a whole before dealing with the specific amendments. Subsection (3) contains a list of relevant considerations; it is not a list of absolute defences. The opening wording of subsection (3) makes that very clear. It states:"““The considerations to which it is relevant to have regard . . . include””." It then gives a list of factors which a court may or may not take into consideration when determining whether the suffering was unnecessary. Furthermore, the court may take other factors into consideration. The list is not exhaustive. Subsection (3) sets out the considerations to which the court could have regard. These focus on the necessity, proportionality, humanity and competence of the conduct. All relevant considerations should be taken into account and weighed against one another as appropriate. Courts have to consider the extent to which the suffering could reasonably have been avoided or reduced. Where suffering occurs in the course of complying with any regulations, licence or code of practice, an offence would not normally be committed. For example, where a horse suffers while it is being used for riot control, this may be considered necessary for the purposes of protecting persons or property. Amendment No. 9 seeks to clarify that any conduct associated with a legitimate activity can be considered, as well as conduct for legitimate purposes. We have not found any examples where such a change to the clause would excuse legitimate conduct that would not otherwise be excused under the present draft. I question whether the amendment is necessary. On Amendment No. 11, I assure Members of the Committee that the inclusion of the protection of property in Clause 4(3) does not mean that protection of property becomes an absolute defence to the offence of cruelty. It merely means that protection of property is one factor that a court may, at its discretion, take into account in determining whether suffering was necessary. That does not indicate a belief on our part that property rights should in any way trump animal suffering. The provision is not to be read in that way; it reflects the reality that in some circumstances the protection of property may justify some level of suffering. Two examples were given in the other place by my honourable friend the Member for Exeter of situations in which this consideration might be relevant—the use of riot horses by police and guard dogs by homeowners. The police use riot horses as the most effective means of protecting people and their property from damage and destruction. Sometimes, unfortunately, the horses will be injured. Likewise, guard dogs are used by private individuals to protect their property and may be injured by a potential or actual burglar who threatens that property. In principle, both the police and the homeowner who put these animals in those situations could be held responsible for their unnecessary suffering by virtue of Clause 4(2). But I hope that Members of the Committee agree that both situations are examples of the protection of property being a legitimate purpose. We do not want police officers and homeowners to be held responsible under Clause 4(2) as long as the court feels that the balance of factors used in Clause 4(3) weighs in favour of the owner’s conduct. Amendment No. 6 seeks to clarify that no liability for failing to act will be imposed under Clause 4 in circumstances where it would not be reasonable to expect a person to act. We intend Clause 4 to operate as it is expected to do. If the noble Baroness withdraws the amendment, I hope to contact her before Report about whether an amendment to Clause 4 is necessary to ensure that we achieve this aim. In other words, we want the clause to operate in the way that is intended and are prepared to have discussions before Report to see if we need to bring forward an amendment to put that beyond doubt. We are rowing the same boat here. I hope that that answers the point; I will come back if need be but, as we can see from the examples given, this is a very sensitive issue. We have laboured the point about the protection of property; it is important, but it is not an overriding factor that justifies the unnecessary suffering of animals. No one is saying that. The Bill’s inclusion of property is in the context that I have set out in my examples.