Animal Welfare Bill

moved Amendment No. 6:"Page 2, line 20, after second ““act”” insert ““where such an act can reasonably be expected””" The noble Baroness said: Clause 4 addresses the duty of care and is a good addition to the duty placed on people to look after animals, but again I have some concerns over the wording. Subsection (1)(b) sensibly includes a proviso that a person has to know about a problem in order to be expected to deal with it. But what it does not do is define adequately the limits of the expectation in the clause. I shall mention a couple of examples. The first is what I would call the ““Good Samaritan”” case where someone passes an injured cat at the side of the motorway—or perhaps a quieter road, because on a motorway one might not see the cat at all. If you notice an injured animal as you drive along, should you stop and take care of it? The second example that comes to mind is of an animal owner with mental health problems. This is a fairly common occurrence. I have come across several cases personally of someone who has a collection of animals and looks after them adequately, but for one reason or another—through ageing or an unforeseen event in their life that makes them less capable—they cease to care for the animals properly. In those circumstances, can it be said that they should have reasonably known what was happening? I suppose the defence of diminished responsibility could be deployed in those instances, as it can be for a crime. However, I should like the Minister to put on the record the exact position regarding such people. I think that my amendment puts forward a reasonable compromise whereby people would be required to help an animal in distress, even if they are not responsible for it, but not to an unreasonable or impracticable extent. Amendment No. 11 in this group covers a point raised by my honourable friend in another place, Norman Baker. Clause 4(3)(c) provides that the protection of property should be taken into account when considering the reason for animal suffering. He made the observation that this could provide a loophole for defending instances of unnecessary suffering in animals. I accept the assurances of the Minister in the other place that this would not be an absolute defence, but the issue has not been considered here. It is therefore reasonable to raise it and ask whether there should be some qualification of the word ““property”” to make sure that that reason arises only in extreme circumstances. The Government have rightly introduced a Bill to prevent animal suffering, so perhaps we should not list so early in the legislation a number of reasons why we might expect animals to suffer, particularly if it was simply in defence of some minor piece of property. I beg to move.