Animal Welfare Bill

Amendment No. 5 would mean that, once someone had abandoned an animal, they would continue to be legally responsible for it indefinitely. We believe that this is unnecessary and could have adverse effects. As we have said consistently, at the point of abandonment a person will commit an offence under this Bill. If someone abandons an animal for which they are responsible and it is unable to fend for itself, he or she will have failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure that its needs are met. Consequently, they are likely to have committed the welfare offence in Clause 9. Also, if as a result of the abandonment suffering had actually occurred, the Bill’s cruelty provisions in Clause 4 would be engaged. We believe that to amend the Bill so that that person continues to be responsible for the animal indefinitely would be unenforceable and undesirable. We are aware of some issues of definition that would arise from the inclusion of the term ““abandonment”” in the Bill. Trying to draft a definition that does not catch the release of game birds, of fish into a stream or pond or of animals on to common land is exceptionally difficult. Consequently, the amendment could have the effect of making a gamekeeper permanently responsible for all the game birds that he releases and may lead to his committing a welfare offence at any time in the future. We are sure that that is not the intention behind the amendment. Amendment No. 44 seeks to ensure that, if someone releases an animal into the wild in circumstances that are unlikely to cause it unnecessary suffering, they will cease to have responsibility for that animal. We consider that when someone releases an animal into the wild, they need to ensure that the animal is not just being released in circumstances that are unlikely to cause it unnecessary suffering. They would also need to ensure that the animal’s needs have been met in order to prevent themselves from falling foul of the welfare offence. There are important differences between abandoning an animal and releasing it into the wild with the realistic intention that it will be able to fend for itself. Examples have already been referred to, such as animal rehabilitation centres returning an animal to the wild, and the release of pheasants. When those activities are undertaken properly, there is a realistic expectation that the animals will be able to fend for themselves, because they have been released in circumstances that would be expected to ensure their survival—for example, suitable environment and diet—in terms of their ability to feed themselves. We consider that the Bill makes it clear when either the welfare offence or the cruelty offence will apply in these types of circumstance. Amendments Nos. 40 and 52 would make it a specific offence to abandon an animal. This is not necessary. Abandonment is merely one way in which the welfare or cruelty offences can be committed. Under the amendments, all acts of abandonment will be treated equally. The Government prefer the approach in the Bill, which makes it clear that it is a more serious event if the animal suffers as a result. To respond to the noble Duke, this is not a question of the Government believing that abandonment is less important; rather, we believe that there are gradations, and it is important that they are taken into account. We do not consider the explicit considerations in subsection (3) of Amendment No. 52, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, to be necessary, as Clause 9 of the Bill already provides for this by ensuring that owners and keepers must provide for an animal’s needs. Subsection (3) of Amendment 40 provides that someone who finds, or is handed, an animal that seems to be have been abandoned can claim ownership to a court after three months of its being abandoned. By definition, it is likely to be impossible to tell precisely when an animal has been abandoned. It would therefore be difficult to judge when the three-month period should start. The Bill provides powers that will allow regulations to be made concerning the reallocation of ownership rights when an animal is abandoned. That involves human rights issues, and very careful thought will need to be given to the way in which the powers given in the Bill are exercised. I look forward to discussing this further when we consider the regulations. In the mean time, the determination of ownership can be left to the courts. That is at least human rights compliant, although we acknowledge that it is far too cumbersome to be used as a general mechanism, hence the procedure that I have just described. I hope that this response satisfies noble Lords.