I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken about the importance that we should attach to citizenship. It is granted to people, as opposed to them having it as a right of birth. We should not give it lightly but certainly nor should we take it away lightly.
I accept and understand the concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, whose deliberations I read with great care and on which sit very eminent members of your Lordships’ House and another place. I know that the committee also has the benefit of great advice, and I think that I shall be appearing before it before too long—hence my being extraordinarily nice about it. I also recognise the strength of feeling of noble Lords on all sides of the Committee on these issues.
Part of the rationale behind this aspect of the legislation concerns issues that followed the terrorist attacks in London this summer. Noble Lords have pointed to the Home Secretary’s list of behaviours, which he said would form the basis of the use of his discretionary powers to deport and exclude from the United Kingdom those whose presence here was deemed not to be conducive to the public good. We have already discussed at Second Reading and elsewhere the particular behaviours that were named and the fact that, although important, they are not to be seen to be exclusive.
When my right honourable friend the Secretary of State considered this matter, he also felt that it was important to have similar powers to withhold and remove British nationality and right of abode where an individual was found to be engaged in such activities.
As my noble friend Lord Judd said—I think that it is a sentiment shared by Members of the Committee—it is fundamentally wrong for those who engage in such activities and who have rights of residence elsewhere to be allowed to acquire and shelter behind their British citizenship, and the right of residence that goes with it, to avoid the consequences that might otherwise befall them. It is not about saying ““never””; it is about setting out the circumstances. Speaking personally, I am affronted that Abu Hamza has British citizenship—I wish that he did not. I think that all noble Lords would agree with me.
Clause 53 replaces an existing criterion for deprivation of nationality—that of having done something ““seriously prejudicial””—with the broader criterion that the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is conducive to the public good to deprive a person of his or her British nationality. In so doing, we recognise that, ultimately, the courts will interpret ““conducive””; that we must be mindful of the Human Rights Act and obey it; that there will be a right of appeal; and that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State must behave reasonably. As noble Lords have said, Clause 54 applies the same test to right of abode.
The question that goes to the nub of the matter is: are there circumstances where the higher test has not been used, but where this test could be used? It is a power to be used not often, but extremely sparingly. But there are indeed circumstances and cases where this test would enable us to deal with individuals. There are cases with which we wish to deal pending this legislation where the higher test might result in an appeal going either way. Examples might include war criminals and human traffickers, although I do not know whether the examples fit the cases, so I would not want noble Lords to interpret them as doing so. So I say in defence of the clause that there are indeed cases—they are not hypothetical or theoretical—where this test will be of value to the Government in dealing with serious and important problems that currently exist. I have indicated what those kinds of problems might be.
Noble Lords are rightly concerned that the test is broad. That is why we have sought to be as clear as possible about the areas of concern. I hope that the normal ways in which courts operate, with rights of appeal and so on, will go some way to satisfying the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, that a decision could never be made on the whim of the Home Secretary, but that it would be subject to being tested in the courts, and rightly so, for that is an important part of the way in which we operate justice in this country.
The noble Baroness, Lady Carnegy, asked what would happen to people whose right of abode we removed, because we have made it clear that we would not make anyone stateless. People have a right of abode because they are citizens of a Commonwealth country other than the UK, so they have somewhere else to go. They are given right of abode because they are citizens elsewhere. They automatically have somewhere else where they could go. I hope that that is clear to the noble Baroness.
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill
Proceeding contribution from
Baroness Ashton of Upholland
(Labour)
in the House of Lords on Thursday, 19 January 2006.
It occurred during Debate on bills
and
Committee proceeding on Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill.
About this proceeding contribution
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2005-06Chamber / Committee
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